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Abstract: Several voices are rising to demand an in-depth reform of capitalism in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2010, the increase in income and wealth inequalities of the last four decades, the 
climate urgency in a local global world. There is a real danger that governments will be put under 
pressure from poorly-informed groups and will want to play Goethe’s sorcerer's apprentice: too often, 
these good intentions are but a paved road to hell. In this document, I analyze various reform projects, I 
discuss the concepts of ethics and equity (environment, water, life, remuneration, inequalities, ESG) and 
I propose to add a project for in-depth reforms of capitalism and social-democracy. 
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Several voices are rising to demand an in-depth reform of capitalism in the wake of the financial 
crisis of 2007-2010, the increase in income and wealth inequalities of the last four decades, the 
climate urgency, the perceived increase in environmental and industrial disasters, the 
intensification and expansion of global trade, the internationalization of cultures, the 
emergence of the global village of Marshall McLuhan into a local global whole. 
We must first understand how these phenomena came to be and what they really mean before 
imagining solutions if necessary. We already know two of the main sources of the crisis of 2007-
2010: the economic policy of easy credit and the pressure of Congress on parastatals Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in favor of subprime mortgages, which brought these companies not so 
much to underestimate the risk of the underlying financial transactions, but rather to have to 
turn a blind eye to these risks. 
While it is necessary to make certain reforms to the functioning of capitalism, we must be 
careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater, a real risk that should not be overlooked. 
There is a danger that governments will put themselves, under the pressure of more or less well 
informed groups, into wanting to play the sorcerer's apprentice of Goethe,1 too often with good 
intentions on the way to hell.  
The market economy, the freedom to undertake and to challenge the established economic 
order, and responsible capitalism remain the best guarantees of development and growth in 
living standards and therefore, among other things, of the development of representative 
diversity, the eradication of poverty, and the reduction of inequalities in consumption and 
inequalities of opportunity. The concept of value, of “true value” to use the expression of the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), is at the heart of this desire for 
reform. 
1.1 The ESG movement 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is an organization of over 
200 large companies from all regions of the world dedicated to developing governance rules 
focused on the pursuit of “real value” rather than solely financial returns. Pursuing real value 
means promoting value creation that takes into account long-term environmental impact and 
                                                                
1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848 
http://www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/4090pdf/manifest.pdf), chapter 1: « Modern bourgeois society, with its 
relations of production, of exchange and of property, that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and 
of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom it has called 




both personal and social well-being; it relies on prices integrating all externalities in both costs 
and benefits. It is also (re)orienting capitalism towards the pursuit of this true value, focused on 
the protection and enhancement of natural, social and financial capital rather than towards the 
pursuit of financial profits and economic efficiency. 
The environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria are a set of standards that investors use 
to filter potential investments, qualified as sustainable investments, responsible investments, 
impact investments, socially responsible investments, or ethical investments.2 ESG criteria can 
also, beyond any ethical concern, allow the identification of companies whose practices could 
signal a risk factor for industrial or environmental disaster.3 
The environmental criteria relate to energy consumption, waste management, in particular 
hazardous waste, pollution, preservation of natural habitats, management of industrial and 
environmental risks. The social criteria relate to the company's relations with its suppliers (do 
they have ESG policies?), the local community (charitable donations; volunteerism of its 
employees), its workers (total compensation; health and safety), and its customers (quality of 
customer service). The governance criteria relate to transparency of accounting methods, 
respect for shareholders, management of conflicts of interest, political contributions known as 
cronyism or undue or even illegal lobbying. All of these ESG criteria also refer to compliance 
with laws and regulations, in particular strict, shared or extended liability rules.4 I will come back 
in more details to ESG approach in section 3.7 below.  
Caveats to keep in mind  
The US Department of Labor published new regulations in late October 2020 that could limit the 
use of ESG criteria in pension plan investment choices.5 The authorities say that “Protecting 
retirement savings is a fundamental mission of the United States Department of Labor and one 
of the primary public policy objectives of our country. This regulation will ensure that pension 
plan trustees focus on the financial interests of plan members and beneficiaries, rather than on 
other non-monetary or political goals. Our goal is to ensure that pension plan trustees have a 
clear focus on the financial interests of participants to receive secure and valuable pension 
                                                                
2 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/environmental-social-and-governance-esg-criteria.asp  
3 Examples are the Deepwater Horizon (British Petroleum) disaster in 2010, the scandal of emissions (Volkswagen), 
and the AZT explosion in Toulouse in 2001. 
4 The World Economic Forum of Davos, in collaboration with Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC, has promoted an 
important ESG movement in 2020 with the publication of a report on measuring and consistent information 
reporting on ESG policies by firms: Measuring Stakeholder Capitalism: Towards Common Metrics and Consistent 
Reporting of Sustainable Value Creation (September 2020). https://www.weforum.org/reports/measuring-
stakeholder-capitalism-towards-common-metrics-and-consistent-reporting-of-sustainable-value-creation 
5 https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20201030  
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benefits. Plan trustees should never sacrifice the interests of participants to promote other non-
financial goals."  
The Department notes that the analysis of so-called ESG investments raises important and 
substantial questions regarding the rigor exercised and the prudence and reliability 
demonstrated. The regulation obliges pension plan trustees to choose investment strategies 
that are essentially or even entirely based on financial performance. 
Boyer and Laffont (1997)6 show that expanding the sphere of liability for environmental 
disasters must also account for the existence of imperfect and incomplete information within 
financial markets themselves, so that environmentally hazardous but otherwise socially useful 
activities are adequately financed. The absence of complete information at all times and in all 
places may justify limiting the imposition of extended liability.  
The CEO of Roviant Sciences, Vivek Ramaswamy, claims in a recent op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal7 that expecting business leaders to make a stand and push for environmental and social 
programs (the ESG approach) gives them too much power. This authority and power should be 
left to governments: “My main problem with stakeholder capitalism is that it strengthens the 
link between democracy and capitalism at a time when we should instead disentangle one from 
the other. Speaking as a CEO and a citizen, I don’t want American capitalists to play a larger role 
in defining and implementing the country’s political and social values. I think the answers to 
these questions should be determined by the citizenry—publicly through debate and privately 
at the ballot box. I believe the reason many corporate executives are speaking up in favor of 
stakeholder capitalism is that they think they will gain popularity at a time when it is unpopular 
to be perceived as a pure capitalist. The crux of the populist concern about capitalism is not that 
companies serve only their shareholders, but rather that capitalism has begun to infect our 
democracy through the influence of dollars in buying political outcomes. The answer is not to 
force capitalism into an arranged marriage with democracy. What we really need is a clean 
divorce.”  
1.2 The notion of value 
Determining the value of a good, a service, an investment, an hour of labor, a public good or 
asset, a permanent work such as a sculpture, a song or a sound recording, is one of the most 
important issues in economics, and also in sociology, philosophy, psychology, and numerous 
other fields of humanities and social sciences. The distinction between total value, average 
                                                                
6 Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1997), “Environmental Risk and Bank Liability,” European Economic 
Review 41, 1427–1459. 
7 Vivek Ramaswamy, “The Stakeholders vs. the People”, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 12 2020.  
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value and marginal value, as developed in the second half of the 19th century, is crucial and 
essential to the understanding not only of economic phenomena but also and above all of the 
notion of value itself. 
In many ways, economists are the scientists of the value, including the value of labor, of human 
capital, of intellectual, physical or financial capital, of natural resources, of the environment 
(space, air, water), of businesses, of infrastructures, of health, of education, of life, etc.  
A fair and equitable price is a competitive price, therefore a price which respects both the 
interests of the suppliers or producers, namely the suppliers of labor, skills, human capital, 
intermediate goods and services, and providers of physical, financial and intellectual capital, 
and the interests of demanders, buyers, users or employers of these goods and services, in a 
context where both the suppliers and the demanders act voluntarily or willingly, a context of 
"willing buyer - willing seller ”, therefore a context of free or competitive exchange. 
The best guarantee that suppliers will be adequately or fairly remunerated for their goods and 
services, including their labor, lies in the competition between those seeking goods and 
services, including those seeking labor. And the best guarantee that demanders will be called 
upon to pay an adequate price or remuneration lies in the competition between suppliers of 
goods and services, including labor. Thus, a competitive price is fundamentally synonymous 
with a fair and equitable price because it respects the freely expressed interests of both 
suppliers and applicants.  
At competitive equilibrium, the price of a product, good or service, is equal to its opportunity 
cost or value, that is, to the value, as estimated by buyers, that the product could generate in 
the best available and accessible alternative use, including in consumption, in leisure or in the 
production of other goods and services. It is also equal to its marginal cost of production which 
measures the value of all kinds of resources used for its production. Thus the competitive 
equilibrium price is both fair and equitable for the supplier / seller and the demander / buyer. 
The value of the goods or services that I offer or sell is determined by my fellow citizens who 
freely estimate what my products bring them in terms of utility, well-being or potential and by 
the opportunity cost or value of resources, labor and others, incorporated into my products. 
The difference being the profit I can get from producing and selling an additional unit (marginal 
value) of goods or services. For the last unit sold, this marginal value is zero, but for all previous 
units (infra-marginal), it is normally positive, while for all additional units, by definition non-
produced, it is negative. 
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In this context, the competitive prices, which measure the marginal value of things, goods and 
services that I produce, would only increase if I can produce goods and services of greater value 
for my fellow citizens.  
There is nothing more stressful and demoralizing than being told or discovering that one’s work 
and efforts do not produce anything interesting, useful or valuable for one's fellow citizens and 
therefore prove to be of no value, or at least that one’s work and efforts do not produce 
anything comparable or better than what other fellow citizens produce and offer. Furthermore, 
in all fairness and equity, I cannot force my fellow citizens to remunerate skills and finance 
operations if these skills and operations do not generate anything useful or valuable for them. 
But at the same time it can be a source of motivation to change the skills portfolio and the 
basket of goods and services that one produces or helps to produce. Also, as a consumer or 
buyer, the other party sends a message like this when he/she decides not to buy a certain 
product, good or service. 
Hence, competitive markets, or surrogate institutions or mechanisms including regulation that 
emulates competitive markets, are the essential element in bringing out the fair and equitable 
social value of things. 
I return later (section 2) to the notion of value, to the value of the environment, to the value of 
water, to the value of life, to fair and equitable remuneration, to the value of the work of 
children, and to the strict and / or extended corporate responsibility for environmental and 
industrial disasters.  
1.3 The role of firms, entrepreneurs, and competition  
A firm can be understood as being a transformation institution, process or mechanism that 
fruitfully or efficiently blends factors of production, namely human labor, materials, natural 
resources, technologies, borrowed capital and equity capital, to generate goods and services 
that are useful to its fellow citizens, end users or businesses as clients, in such a way that the 
total value of its products is larger or at least not-smaller than the total cost of all factors used 
when the latter are paid or compensated at the value of their best alternative use. If that is the 
case, the firm is clearly generating net value and creating wealth. How to make sure that it 
does? Through competition and willing buyer willing seller exchanges.  
Consider four types of enterprises: the capitalist enterprise, the socialist or cooperative 
enterprise, the labor enterprise, the idea-based enterprise. In each case, the residual decision-
making power, other than those provided for by contract, will belong to the group paid last, 
namely financial capital (capitalist company), human capital (labor company) or intellectual 
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capital (idea-based company). The four types considered and described below are abstract and 
generic. In reality, companies can depend partly on one type and partly on another. 
 The capitalist firm pays in priority all its factors other than equity capital, which is paid last, that 
is, compensated by the residual value, namely the total value of the products minus the total 
cost of the priority factors. This residual value is typically uncertain, may be positive or negative, 
and will in expected or average terms represent also the value of the best alternative use of 
equity financial capital. More generally, compensation of all factors and the value of their best 
alternative uses are done or calculated on a risk-adjusted basis.  
The socialist or cooperative enterprise will generally distribute the total value of its products 
among all factors or partners in a more egalitarian order of priority without being completely 
egalitarian, making the compensation of all factors or partners uncertain or risky and variable 
over time. But these compensations must represent on average or in expectation the value of 
the factors in their best alternative use. More generally, the compensation for all factors and 
the value of their best alternative uses must be done or calculated on a risk-adjusted basis. 
The labor company will pay in priority all its factors other than labor, which will be paid last, that 
is to say compensated by the residual value, i.e. the total value of the products less the total 
cost of the priority factors, including suppliers and borrowed capital (the Labor company is 
financed by assumption at 100% by borrowing at market conditions). This residual value will 
generally be uncertain, can be positive or negative, variable over time, but must represent on 
average or in expectation the value of the work in its best alternative uses. More generally, the 
compensation of all factors, including borrowed capital and labor, and the value of their best 
alternative uses should be done or calculated on a risk-adjusted basis. 
The idea-based company will pay in priority all its factors other than the idea-owners (holders of 
intellectual property), which will be paid last, that is to say compensated by the residual value, 
which is the total value of the products minus the total cost of priority factors, including 
suppliers and borrowed capital (the idea-based company will hypothetically finance itself 100% 
by borrowing at market terms). This residual value will generally be uncertain, can be positive or 
negative, variable over time, but must represent, on average or in expectation, the value of 
ideas or of the intellectual property (or of the efforts that have generated this intellectual 
property) in their best alternative use. More generally, the compensation for all factors and the 
value of their best alternative uses must be done or calculated on a risk-adjusted basis  
The entrepreneur is in each case the innovator by excellence, the master cook who blends the 
ingredients to raise social wellbeing. In modern businesses, this entrepreneur is personified by 
the CEO as the leader ultimately responsible for the success and growth of the firm or 
organization. The Corporate Finance Institute states that the roles and responsibilities of a CEO 
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vary from one company to another, depending in part on the organizational structure and/or 
size of the company but the typical duties, responsibilities, and job description of a CEO include, 
among others: leading the development of the company’s short- and long-term strategy; 
maintaining awareness of the competitive market landscape, expansion opportunities, and 
industry developments; assessing risks to the company and ensuring they are monitored and 
minimized; and setting strategic goals and making sure they are measurable and describable.       
In other words, the CEO personifies first and foremost the design, development, and 
management of the firm’s real options:8 the recognition that uncertainty creates opportunities 
and value; the recognition that such value requires adequate decisions in order to materialize, 
including the determination of the scale and scope of the firm; the identification of the sources 
of uncertainty and the collection of information; the identification of the decisions (options) 
that promote exposition to favorable developments and/or reduce exposure to unfavorable 
ones; the design of optimal decision rules and their delegation throughout the firm. The real 
options approach is mostly a way of thinking and adjusting one’s behavior accordingly. Its 
application throughout the firm is a responsibility of the CEO.  
Of course, there is no reason preventing the CEO from playing, as a concerned citizen, an active 
role in his/her community, but the role as citizen and the role as CEO must be properly 
differentiated.  
Moreover, how can we make sure that firms generate net social value and create wealth? By 
subjecting them to competition. Competitive intensity will favor the emergence of efficient 
firms and the closing of inefficient ones. Competitive markets for factors of production and for 
end products, goods and services, favor the proper value accounting, making sure that firms 
compensate their factors at their best alternative use and commercialize valuable goods and 
services for end consumers and businesses. When all factors of production are directly or 
indirectly priced at their competitive value, and all end products are sold directly or indirectly at 
competitive prices, the firms, competing with each other including forthcoming new innovative 
firms, will be forced either to use the optimal blend of factors properly compensated at their 
best alternative value (opportunity cost) to produce an appropriate set of end products thereby 
generating a net social value and creating wealth, or go out of business or go bankrupt.        
This is the gist of Friedman's assertion that the social responsibility of corporations is to 
maximize profits. Profit maximization is an efficiency measure that serves all of the firm’s 
stakeholders. Competition prevents a company in a competitive situation and surrounded by 
                                                                
8 See Marcel Boyer, “CEO pay in perspective”, CIRANO 2019s-33, 52 pages. 




competitive markets, from exploiting its workers, cheating its suppliers, and / or deceiving its 
customers. Competition prevents the company from generating durably supra-competitive 
profits and therefore prevent it from compensating equity holders beyond the best alternative 
value of capital. 
Competition, properly understood, measured and regulated, is the cornerstone of this socio-
economic organization model. 
2. Ethics and Equity  
Environmentalist Joan Roughgarden (2001)9 writes:  
“Economists are not about to cede the moral high ground to ecologists just 
because humanity is contained in a giant ecosystem. In principle, economics 
deals with ‘ethical efficiency’ — trying to achieve the most good for the most 
people given a ‘budget constraint’ of either time or money. Of course, matters 
may not work out so ideally, but it’s important to realize that the ethical 
starting points for both ecologists and economists are equally noble.” 
For purposes of our discussion, five topics will illustrate the complexity of the relationship 
between on the one hand the competition and capitalism compact and on the other hand the 
ethics and equity compact: the fair and equitable or ethical value of the environment, of water, 
of life, of behaviour underlying collaboration, concertation and competition, of compensation, 
and of investment (socially responsible investment and ESG economy). 
2.1 Environment (Externalities) 
In his landmark speech to the Environmental Grantmakers Association10 in 2001, Bill Moyer, 
commentator on PBS, said:11 
“If you want to fight for the environment, don’t hug a tree, hug an 
economist. Hug the economist who tells you that fossil fuels are not only 
                                                                
9 Joan Roughgarden (2001), “Guide to Diplomatic Relations with Economists,” Bull. Ecol. Soc. America 82, pp.85–88. 
10 On this association’s website (https://ega.org/) we read: “The Environmental Grantmakers Association (EGA) was 
formed in 1987 with twelve member foundations from across the United States. Today, our members represent 
over 200 foundations from North America and around the world. Recognizing the importance of diverse 
perspectives, the organization values ecological integrity, justice, environmental stewardship, inclusivity, 
transparency, accountability, respect and balancing pragmatism with idealism. EGA will strive to “walk the talk” 
with all of its resources and focus. The ultimate goal of EGA and its members is a world with healthy, equitable, and 
sustainable ecosystems, communities, and economies.” 




the third most heavily subsidized economic sector after road 
transportation and agriculture but that they also promote vast 
inefficiencies. Hug the economist who tells you that the most efficient 
investment of a dollar is not in fossil fuels but in renewable energy sources 
that not only provide new jobs but cost less over time. Hug the economist 
who tells you that the price system matters; it’s potentially the most 
potent tool of all for creating social change. Look what California did this 
summer in responding to its recent energy crisis with a price structure that 
rewards those who conserve and punishes those who don’t. Californians 
cut their electric consumption by up to 15%.” 
Ecologists and environmentalists sometimes seem to believe that using and degrading natural 
ecological systems is inherently wrong and immoral. Economists disagree. Rather, they consider 
that using ecological or environmental systems is socially fair and ethical if it is the outcome of 
decisions by institutions or mechanisms, including regulation, emulating competitive markets. 
Environment protection poses complex problems due to the fact that environmental 
degradation is an externality for economic agents, consumers, companies, and others. 
Moreover, this externality is not local but global, which induce more free-riding and wasting 
behaviors. In general, since the costs of environmental degradation are not directly borne by 
economic agents, they tend to overuse environmental resources. Economists refer to this 
phenomenon as the tragedy of the commons:12 If a common good or asset or common property 
is not adequately priced, economic agents, whether cooperatives, private or public firms, trade 
unions, consumers, governments, NGOs, or religious organizations, tend to overexploit it, 
thereby threatening its survival.  
Two other dimensions of the environmental problem are the inertia of climate change which 
can only be modified over time, and the uncertainties about the accumulation of GHG 
(Greenhouse Gases), about the impacts, about technological changes, and the "value" today of 
future events. Net GHG emissions (emissions minus removals) accumulate and their impacts are 
felt over several years or decades. Uncertainties in the processes of accumulation, of impacts, of 
technological changes and others, re quire a recourse to the precautionary principle, to option 
                                                                
12 Garrett Hardin (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 162 (3859), 1243-1248. Hardin writes (page 
1244): “Adam Smith… contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive 
action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, 
be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our present 
policy of laissez-faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity 
so as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine our individual 
freedoms to see which ones are defensible. The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control… We may well 
call it ‘the tragedy of the commons’." 
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valuation, to discounting of the future. We are talking about a "GHG stock" with "poorly 
understood common bio-social impacts" that must be "managed in the fog" so that it does not 
increase above a "level considered acceptable or catastrophic”. This is why, at the national level, 
the government has a crucial role to play in finding ways to protect society from inefficient use, 
present and future, of this common, crucial and planetary asset that is the environment.  
Competitive markets at the service of the environment 
The design of any economic policy involves two phases: The first is devoted to defining goals 
and the second to choosing the instruments, mechanisms, and processes by which the goals will 
be pursued, the methods for evaluating the results, and the potential corrective measures to 
take. There are two main types of instruments, those of the “command and control,” or 
prescriptive, variety, on the one hand, and “market- or incentive-based instruments,” on the 
other. Whatever the policy retained and the objectives pursued, it is imperative that the means 
implemented pass the test of efficiency.  
While the stage of defining policy and its objectives may be the subject of legitimate differences 
of opinion between various groups with divergent views, it is surprising to find so much discord 
at the policy implementation stage, as if the means of achieving a policy could itself be subject 
to any criteria other than efficiency. 
The following belong to the class of prescriptive instruments: regulated design specifications, 
mandatory use of specific production or abatement technologies, and caps on how much 
pollution an identified source, whether corporate or otherwise, may emit or release. 
In the category of market instruments we find: taxation and pricing of pollutants, such as pricing 
or taxation of garbage and waste water; refundable deposits on plastic or glass products, 
batteries, tires, etc.; user fees in the case of gasoline and motor oil, heavy vehicles, trucks and 
trailers; liability insurance taxes on hazardous products to finance Superfund13; the pricing of 
operating permits for polluting activities; differentiated negative taxation (subsidies) on less 
polluting products such as methanol, natural gas, ethanol, wind power generation, public 
transit, etc.; the reduction or abolition of subsidies to polluting industries such as the coal and 
fossil fuel industries, intensive agriculture, industrial livestock farming, forestry, commercial 
fishing, industrial chemicals, etc.; more recent mechanisms for allocating tradable pollution 
permits; even more recent regulatory mechanisms for informing the public about the risks that 
companies’ products and operations pose to their workers and citizens, thus impacting the 
reputation of polluters positively or negatively. In terms of mechanisms for regulating pollution 
                                                                
13 « Superfund » is the name given in the USA to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, a federal law aimed at facilitating the clean-up of dangerously polluted sites. 
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through public information, we draw attention to the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) announcement in February 2002 of the launch of the “climate leaders” program, 
which has evolved in 2012 into the Center for Climate Leadership, “a comprehensive resource to 
help organizations of all sizes measure and manage GHG emissions.”14 This program, based on 
voluntary participation, seeks to challenge companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
(carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, fluorinated hydrocarbons, fully halogenated 
fluorinated hydrocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride). The EPA publicly recognizes companies 
that work with it to develop aggressive, efficient, and credible programs to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. This public recognition, coupled with the public naming of major polluters, is 
intended to encourage reputation-conscious companies to implement cost-effective control 
programs. 
These mechanisms require public access to information (Internet) on self-protection (reducing 
the likelihood of a company causing a major industrial accident) and self-insurance (reducing 
the human and material costs that would result from a major industrial accident) programs. 
They promote managerial responsibility and accountability in companies. They promote also the 
creation of new markets thanks to new information and communications technologies such as 
complex, combinatorial auctions with several dozen or even hundreds of steps, making it 
possible to provide effective market solutions to the traditional problems posed by 
complementarities and externalities. They encourage the search for and emergence of 
innovative and more effective solutions by ensuring maximum transparency, such as rules of 
strict, shared or extended liability for all partners in the polluting activity, particularly in cases 
where liability for environmental disasters could lead to the bankruptcy of the company 
concerned.15  
Boyer and Porrini (2001)16 develop a formal analytical framework that incorporates a political 
economy analysis to use in comparing different environmental policy instruments. The first is 
the application of a strict, retroactive, and joint liability regime for the owners and operators, 
possibly extended to their financial and technological partners, of companies responsible for a 
                                                                
14 https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership  
15 For further discussion, see Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1996), “Environmental Protection, Producer 
Insolvency and Lender Liability,” in Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources edited by Athanasios 
Xepapadeas (Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd.); Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1997), “Environmental Risk and Bank 
Liability,” European Economic Review 41, 1427–1459; Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1999), “Toward a 
Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation,” Rand Journal of Economics 30, 137–157; 
Marcel Boyer, Tracy Lewis et W.L. Liu (2000), “Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement,” 
Canadian Journal of Economics 33, 319–340. 
16 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini (2001), “Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument 




major environmental disaster. The second is a sophisticated regulatory system based on a menu 
of incentive contracts but vulnerable to capture by regulated companies. Boyer and Porrini 
(2004)17 derive a series of results showing under which conditions each of these instruments 
dominates the other. 
At a conference at the University of Perpignan in October 2001 a participant asked me whether 
we should not protect consumers, especially the poorest, from the first type of market 
instrument: taxes and tariffs on polluting products. I replied that, on the contrary, they should 
not be protected, since the purpose of the policy is precisely to reduce the consumption of 
products the production of which is particularly polluting. In some cases, the fiscal revenues 
thus generated are returned to citizens on a basis that is independent of their consumption of 
polluting goods.18   
This allowed me to point out the distinction between the issue of income and wealth 
distribution and the need for static and dynamic efficiency in the production and consumption 
of those goods and services that contribute to the population’s wellbeing. The pervasive 
confounding of these issues of distribution and efficiency is an ongoing source of fruitless 
debate that undermines the prospect of genuine environmental protection.  
As for tradable permit systems, several real-world experiments using permits for air pollution, 
toxic products, chlorofluorocarbon emissions (Montreal Protocol), and sulphur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions (acid rain), and others have yielded promising results.  
Another participant asked me whether these pollution permit markets would not benefit the 
wealthiest countries at the expense of the poorest. I replied once again that, on the contrary, 
efficiency in attaining a level of environmental protection can only benefit poorer countries for 
whom the squandering of resources, environmental or otherwise, is particularly costly. Here 
again, it is important to separate efficiency issues from issues of wealth redistribution. 
Development assistance and the search for efficient (and therefore less costly) instruments for 
implementing policies must be two sides of the same coin, each finding an ally in the other.  
It is important to bear in mind a major finding of the economic analysis of instrument choice. In 
a full-information situation, i.e. a situation in which all partners have the same information, 
however incomplete it may be, market-based and command and control instruments can in 
                                                                
17 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini (2004), “Modeling the Choice between Liability and Regulation in terms of 
Social Welfare,” Canadian Journal of Economics 37(3), 590–612. 
18 This is precisely the principle underlying the Government of Canada's program announced in December 2020: A 
generalized carbon tax whose tax proceeds will be redistributed to citizens on a basis independent of their carbon-
generating activities.    
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theory achieve the same level of pollution abatement and the same level of innovation in 
pollution control technologies. In this sense they can be considered equivalent. However, they 
may differ in the relative cost of achieving the targets set by the environmental protection 
policy, in their relative capacities to effectively capitalize on all the relevant information and 
expertise available, and in their respective risks of missing or exceeding these objectives.  
The main difference between these two types of instruments is that the former do not explicitly 
tell the polluting companies what to do. They are regulatory tools that change behaviour via 
price signals rather than through explicit instructions on methods and levels of pollution control. 
Decisions on the level of pollution abatement and the technologies to be used to achieve it are 
left to the companies themselves.  
Pollution abatement is expensive. Thus, a firm will have to incur a certain level of disbursements 
on labour, materials, and capital to reduce its pollution by one unit, whatever actual amount 
that unit represents. This minimum level of expenditure represents the marginal cost of 
pollution abatement to the firm. A first criterion for the efficient allocation of resources devoted 
to pollution abatement is that the pollution levels of individual firms should be such that the 
marginal cost of a further reduction of one unit of pollution is the same for all firms.  
Indeed, if two firms have different marginal costs of pollution control, it would be efficient to 
redistribute pollution (or pollution abatement) levels by requiring the firm with the lower 
marginal cost to reduce its pollution more and the firm with the higher marginal cost to increase 
its pollution, so as to save resources and reduce the total social cost of environmental policy 
while keeping the pollution level constant. Thus, if this first efficiency condition is not satisfied, 
the chosen instrument may be described as inefficient because it wastes scarce social resources 
that could be used in a different place or activity to increase social wealth.  
In order to satisfy this first efficiency criterion, a command and control type instrument (such as 
a system of pollution caps) must be such that the distribution of these caps among the polluting 
companies ensures that the marginal costs of pollution abatement are the same for each. In 
order to achieve this, the agency responsible for setting and allocating these caps would clearly 
need to know the evolution of the marginal cost of abatement at the level corresponding to the 
cap for all companies—a quasi-impossible Herculean task.  
On the other hand, a market-based instrument such as a tax per unit of pollution produced will 
ensure that each firm will have an incentive, in order to maximize its profits, to adjust its 
production and pollution level in such a way that the marginal cost of pollution abatement 
equals the tax imposed on the marginal unit of pollution. If the marginal cost in factors (labour, 
materials, and capital) of reducing pollution is lower than the tax payable on the marginal unit 
of pollution emitted, the firm will be able to increase its profit by reducing its pollution by one 
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unit. It will have every incentive to reduce its emissions to the point where the marginal cost of 
abatement becomes equal to the tax payable on the marginal unit of pollution. Since all firms 
have an interest in performing these same calculations, equality of marginal costs is obtained in 
a decentralized manner, which can represent a significant savings, in terms of information 
gathering and computation, over prescriptive mechanisms.  
On January 17 2019, the Wall Street Journal published what is one of the widest consensus 
among economists, namely the statement on carbon dividends initiated by the Climate 
Leadership Council https://www.econstatement.org/. The statement reads as follows:  
“Global climate change is a serious problem calling for immediate action. Guided 
by sound economic principles, we are united in the following policy 
recommendations.  
 A carbon tax offers the most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions 
at the scale and speed that is necessary. By correcting a well-known market 
failure, a carbon tax will send a powerful price signal that harnesses the 
invisible hand of the marketplace to steer economic actors towards a low-
carbon future.  
 A carbon tax should increase every year until emissions reductions goals are 
met and be revenue neutral to avoid debates over the size of government. A 
consistently rising carbon price will encourage technological innovation and 
large-scale infrastructure development. It will also accelerate the diffusion 
of carbon-efficient goods and services.  
 A sufficiently robust and gradually rising carbon tax will replace the need 
for various carbon regulations that are less efficient. Substituting a price 
signal for cumbersome regulations will promote economic growth and 
provide the regulatory certainty companies need for long- term investment 
in clean-energy alternatives.  
 To prevent carbon leakage and to protect national competitiveness, a 
border carbon adjustment system should be established. This system would 
enhance the competitiveness of national firms that are more energy-
efficient than their global competitors. It would also create an incentive for 
other nations to adopt similar carbon pricing.  
 To maximize the fairness and political viability of a rising carbon tax, all the 
revenue should be returned directly to U.S. citizens through equal lump-sum 
rebates. The majority of families, including the most vulnerable, will benefit 




It remains for the responsible government agency to set the right level of effort of pollution 
abatement, that is, the right level of carbon tax to implement, a difficult but much less resource-
intensive task than that of directly controlling pollution emission standards across products and 
allocating pollution quotas to all companies. There is a wide range of proposed carbon tax 
levels.  
In the underlying document Climate Leadership Roadmap19 one can read: “Accordingly, the first 
pillar of our bipartisan plan is an economy-wide fee on CO2 emissions starting at $40 a ton 
(2017$) and increasing every year at 5% above inflation. If implemented in 2021, this will cut 
U.S. CO2 emissions in half by 2035 (as compared to 2005) and far exceed the U.S. Paris 
commitment. To ensure these targets are met, an Emissions Assurance Mechanism will 
temporarily increase the fee faster if key reduction benchmarks are not achieved.” A US$40 a 
ton tax (2017$) increasing every year at 5% above inflation will likely lead to a US$100 or C$130 
a ton tax in 2030. This will most likely be insufficient to exceed the U.S. Paris commitment.   
The Canadian government recently announced the setting of a C$170 per ton carbon tax for 
2030. This level targeted for 2030 may not be sufficient. The more rigorous studies carried out 
in France by the Quinet Commission (2019)20 on the tutelary value of carbon led it to affirm that 
this value should be 250€2018 ($C2018375) in 2030: 
“Based on modeling efforts to date, the commission recommends – starting with 
the current shadow price of €54 in 2018 – adopting a social value of mitigation 
activities of €2018250 in 2030. This value is a great deal higher than the current 
baseline value outlined by the commission in 2008 (€2008100, so €110 in today's 
value). This mainly reflects the fact that we are behind schedule and the 
correlative increase in the level of ambition beyond the "Factor 4", both of which 
incur high abatement costs across several sectors of the economy, not least 
agriculture, some industrial sectors (cement, chemical industry or steel), and 
long-distance freight transport (by road, air or sea). The abatement costs also 
reflect the current inadequacy of the coordinated global response and the lack of 
international flexibility mechanisms available to the 2008 commission… 
Ultimately, the commission recommends adopting a €2018500 value in 2040 and a 
                                                                
19 Climate Leadership Council, Climate Leadership Roadmap. https://clcouncil.org/Bipartisan-Climate-Roadmap.pdf 
20 https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/fs-2019-rapport-la-valeur-de-laction-
pour-le-climat_0.pdf. See also Alain Quinet, “Quelle valeur donner à l’action pour le climat ? / What Value Do We 
Attach to Climate Action?’, Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics N° 510-511-512, INSEE, 2019 
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/fichier/4253150/510_511_512_Quinet_EN.pdf and Christian Gollier, “The 




€2018775 value in 2050. These fall within the range of the most recent carbon 
values outlined in the IPCC's latest special report, dated October 2018.” (p.20-21) 
These numbers are likely going to change as we move toward 2030 and beyond, hence the 
statement by CLC: “To ensure these targets are met, an Emissions Assurance Mechanism will 
temporarily increase the fee faster if key reduction benchmarks are not achieved.”  
Nevertheless, with regard to the first criterion for the efficient allocation of effort and resources 
(equality of marginal costs of pollution abatement across firms and activities), it appears that 
market instruments largely dominate command and control instruments. The cost savings that 
can be attained by market instruments compared to command and control instruments are 
considerable, amounting to as much as several billion dollars per year. 
Several criticisms have been raised about these market mechanisms and in particular about the 
carbon tax. First and foremost, the difficulties of properly measuring carbon emissions, setting 
the level of the tax and putting it into practice at the scale of the economy. More often than 
not, these critiques stem from a lack of understanding of basic economic mechanisms regarding 
the role of prices and incomes in the decisions of economic agents, consumers and producers.21   
Efficiency in Terms of Expertise and Information.  
It should be noted, however, that market instruments can be relatively inefficient when there is 
a desire to centralize information and expertise on optimal pollution abatement. This might be 
the case, for example, if the same information and expertise were used by a large number of 
companies. Sharing the costs of information and expertise requires a certain degree of 
coordination that is more difficult for market instruments than for command and control 
instruments to muster. At first, it seems that the latter instruments are more amenable to 
capturing the benefits of centralized information and expertise more efficiently than would be 
possible under the conflicting interests and competition between firms.  
Market-based instruments provide greater incentives than command and control instruments 
for firms to research and implement technologically innovative pollution abatement systems. 
This is because they allow firms to capture a significant share of the benefits of these 
innovations. Thus, market instruments such as taxes on emissions and tradable pollution 
permits are generally more dynamically efficient than regulations and mandated pollution 
technologies and caps because they increase the intensity of incentives to innovate in pollution 
                                                                
21 An example among others is the commentary by Ellen R. Wald, « The Climate Leadership Council's Devious Plan 
to Distract American Carbon Consumers », Forbes Magazine, June 20 2017. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2017/06/20/the-climate-leadership-councils-devious-plan-to-distract-
american-carbon-consumers/?sh=53f5a3ac6ad6   
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abatement. By increasing the incentives for firms to innovate in order to maximize not only their 
short-term profits but also their long-term valuations, market instruments are likely to lead to 
the emergence of more efficient and less socially costly “green” technologies (Jaffe and Stavins, 
1995).22 
In a recent blog, Matt Ridley (National Review, December 3 2020) writes:  
“In 2019 wind and solar between them supplied just 1.5 percent of the 
world’s energy consumption. Hydro supplied 2.6 percent, nuclear 1.7 
percent, and all the rest — 94 percent — came from burning things: coal, 
oil, gas, wood, and biofuels… The world needs energy innovation if it is to 
reduce the use of fossil fuels… And although the efficiency of energy 
consumption is improving, it cannot solve the problem… Nuclear power 
could supply all our needs from a comparatively tiny footprint of land and 
steel, but we have made innovation in nuclear all but impossible by 
massively increasing the cost and time required to license a new design… 
Molten-salt reactors will one day be more efficient, safer, and cheaper, 
but only if there is a revolution in regulation as much as one in technology. 
Keep your eye on Canada, which is trying to achieve this… Fusion energy is 
another innovation we promised but failed to deliver... There is renewed 
hope, however, that low-temperature superconductors and “spherical 
tokamak” designs may yet crack the problem of controlled fusion and that 
by 2040 we will have abundant, cheap, reliable energy on tap. If that were 
to happen, through molten-salt fission or through fusion, imagine what 
we could do. We could synthesize fuel for transport, dismantle wind 
turbines and oil pipelines, stop burning trees in power stations, desalinate 
enough water to supply the human race without touching wild rivers, and 
suck carbon-dioxide out of the air. Above all, we could raise the standard 
of living of the poorest on the planet. It is surely worth a try…” 
An important and often overlooked dimension of instrument choice is the analysis of the 
relative risks associate with different types of instruments. Indeed, whatever type of instrument 
is chosen, there is always a risk of falling short of the goals of the environmental protection 
                                                                
22 Jaffe, A.B. and R.N. Stavins (1995), “Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulation: The Effects of Alternative 
Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29, 43–63. 
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policy, even if the instruments chosen would make it possible on average, or under normal 
conditions, to achieve these objectives.23  
One of the objectives of instrument choice when implementing an environmental protection 
policy is to ensure that those who have the information are primarily responsible for the policy. 
Indeed, informational efficiency can lead to considerable savings given the issue’s complexity.  
To illustrate, consider the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) passed in 1980 and amended in 1985 and 1996 by the United States Congress. This 
law holds the “owners” and “operators” of a company that causes an environmental disaster 
liable. Jurisprudence has evolved toward a growing recognition of the liability of the banks that 
finance the company on the principle that banks’ involvement in the company’s operations 
make them comparable to the “operators” recognized as liable in the law, despite the explicit 
recognition of the banks’ right to intervene to protect their interests as creditors. It is useful 
here to cite the court’s ruling in the case involving the financial institution Fleet Factors 
prosecuted under the CERCLA Act: 
“Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to investigate 
thoroughly the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors. 
If the treatment systems seem inadequate, the risk of CERCLA liability will 
be weighed into the terms of the loan agreement. Creditors, therefore, will 
incur no greater risk than they bargained for and debtors, aware that 
inadequate hazardous waste treatment will have a significant adverse 
impact on their loan terms, will have powerful incentives to improve their 
handling of hazardous wastes. Similarly, creditors’ awareness that they 
are potentially liable under CERCLA will encourage them to monitor the 
hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and 
insist upon compliance with acceptable treatment standards as a 
prerequisite to continued and future financial support … [W]e share the 
district court’s conclusion that Fleet’s alleged conduct brought it outside 
the statutory exemption for secured creditors.  Indeed, Fleet’s involvement 
would pass the threshold for operator liability.  Fleet weakly contends that 
                                                                
23 If the estimates of the marginal costs and marginal benefits of pollution control are subject to error, then 
paraphrasing and reinterpreting Martin Weitzman’s results (“Prices vs Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies 
41(4), 1974, 477–491) allows us to state that, in the context of an environmental protection policy, command and 
control instruments (analogous to quota-based abatement) will be more likely to meet policy goals than market 
instruments (analogous to price-based abatement) if the respective rates at which the marginal cost and marginal 
benefit of changing the level of abatement are such that the former is higher than the latter. This condition is 
somewhat complicated and its details are beyond the scope of this document. However, it does shed some light on 
the complexity of the analysis of the choice of instruments for environmental protection. 
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its activity at the facility from the time of the auction was within the 
secured creditor exemption because it was merely protecting its security 
interest in the facility and foreclosing its security interest in its equipment, 
inventory, and fixtures.  This assertion, even if true, is immaterial to our 
analysis. The scope of the secured creditor exemption is not determined 
whether the creditor’s activity was taken to protect its security interest.  
What is relevant is the nature and extent of the creditor’s involvement 
with the facility, not its motive.  To hold otherwise would enable secured 
creditors to take indifferent and irresponsible actions towards their 
debtors’ hazardous wastes with impunity by incanting that they were 
protecting their security interests. Congress did not intend CERCLA to 
sanction such abdication of responsibility.” (Extract of the 1990 ruling by 
Judge Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit Court in the case US vs Fleet 
Factors)24. 
As one might expect, this ruling caused quite a stir, not only in the United States but also in 
Europe. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the rules governing liability in 
environmental disasters can be treated as a market instrument. The judge in the above case 
wanted to extend liability to all partners of the company at fault in order to give the institutions 
and agents with the greatest access to information the right incentives to use their inside 
information in the most socially beneficial way.  
To the extent that the banks that finance companies posing major environmental risks have 
inside information or are well positioned to obtain inside information on the operations of these 
firms, it may be socially efficient to make them jointly liable with their clients for the 
environmental damage that the latter may cause. Making banks and other financial institutions 
liable for environmental damage caused by their corporate clients can thus generate the right 
incentives for production, self-protection, and self-insurance at a lower cost.  
The Challenge of Adopting Market Instruments  
In light of the clear relative efficiency of market instruments in terms of cost, information, R&D 
investment, risk management, etc., why is their adoption by various government bodies not 
more widespread? First of all, it must be acknowledged that these instruments are gaining 
currency, although the majority of those currently in use continue to be prescriptive in nature. 
As the understanding of economics increases among politicians and social leaders with a specific 
                                                                
24 https://casetext.com/case/us-v-fleet-factors-corp-3. See also Kathy E. B. Robb and Christopher Sheehey (1992), 
“Lender Liability for Contaminated Land”, Journal of Environmental Law, 4 [1], pp 145-158. 
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interest in implementing effective environmental policy, market-based instruments are making 
significant inroads.  
This development is to be welcomed as the costs of increasingly aggressive environmental 
policies are likely to rise substantially in the coming years. Thus, it can be expected that the 
efficiency of instruments implemented to achieve environmental policy goals at the lowest cost 
will become a central preoccupation of policy makers.  
On the other hand, we also need to reckon with pressure groups that may see these market 
instruments as a way for companies and governments to abdicate their responsibilities. They 
may prefer the status quo in environmental policy instruments and strive to block the quest for 
innovative and more efficient solutions to environmental protection. These pressure groups, 
both environmental groups and businesses that profit from the relative inefficiency of existing 
instruments, can derail the best intentions for environmental protection by their ignorance of 
the real challenges associated with combining economic growth with optimal environmental 
protection.  
In concluding our discussion of competition and the environment, it may be worthwhile to 
reiterate that economic analysis is an important factor in environmental protection. Thus, it is 
misguided and misleading to present environment and economy, or environmentalists and 
economists, as being on opposing teams. In many instances, economists are strong and credible 
advocates for the environment. Indeed, economists are first and foremost experts in system 
efficiency, whether the system is production, consumption, public policy, investment, or 
environmental protection. The role of economists is to analyze the characteristics of a system in 
terms of efficiency and effectiveness.  
In the context of environmental protection, the approach of economists is to identify 
shortcomings that are attributable to the absence of markets, leading to overexploitation of 
environmental resources. This phenomenon is not new, nor is it limited to environmental issues. 
Economic theory provides a good explanation for environmental degradation when the absence 
of property rights, public or private, prevents free negotiation and thus the emergence of 
competitive equilibrium prices.  
We should not downplay the challenges and barriers to the creation of markets and market 
institutions in a field like environmental protection. Current and recurring challenges and 
failures to reach an agreement on markets for carbon pricing and trading at the Madrid 
Conference of the Parties in 2019—which followed up on the conferences of the parties in Paris 
(2015) and Katowice (2017) and where the necessity of this type of agreement was 
highlighted—attest to the difficulties faced to date and going forward. Unfortunately, the 
economic solution to the difficulties, hurdles, challenges, and issues raised by environmental 
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protection is ultimately sidelined by well-intentioned but idle and useless chatter among those 
on the forefront who, sadly, have no understanding of the issue.25   
Moreover, the presence of significant information asymmetries is likely to give rise to endless 
posturing and bickering in which all try to derive strategic advantage from their private 
information. The solution therefore lies in the definition of tradable property rights on the one 
hand and the use of environmental resource pricing on the other.  
In both cases, the goal is optimal environmental protection, and the best instruments and 
mechanisms for achieving it are primarily associated with free markets. These instruments and 
mechanisms make it possible to clearly define the concept of optimal protection (equilibrium) 
and to achieve this level of protection efficiently—i.e. by devoting the right level of social 
resources to it.26 
2.2 Protecting and Sharing Water  
Water is probably the resource with the greatest importance to humanity. From a relatively 
abundant resource in ancient times, water has become a scarce resource with the explosive 
growth of the world’s population and the phenomenal development of the world’s economies.  
To the extent that the distribution of water resources differs from the distribution of the 
population and water intensive economic activities, there is a need to trade or even market 
water if we are to balance availability and needs. In a publication to be released in 2021,27 Maria 
Kouyoumijian and I focus on two main sets of issues related to water economics. 
First, the need to improve water management with efficient instruments and institutions based 
on competitive markets, including appropriate pricing and well-regulated trade. Socially 
responsible management of water resources has become a global challenge and represents a 
major opportunity for development and wealth creation for all. 
Second, the need to use all available means to inform all stakeholders of the increasing value 
and cost of water: users, including individuals, households and businesses; public and private 
                                                                
25 On this subject, see Christian Gollier, L’environnement après la fin du mois, PUF, 2019. 
26 A recent example of ill-defined actions moved by good intentions but flawed analysis is the cancellation of the 
Keystone XL pipeline authorization by President Biden on the day of his inauguration. Rather than implementing a 
competitive prices approach through a carbon tax, the US government pursues the good policy with inadequate 
means, clearly a concession to its political base, more interested in symbolic gestures than true environmental 
protection. Contrary to implementing a proper carbon tax, stopping the Keystone XL pipeline will have no effect on 
the consumption of fossil fuels. Similarly, the criticism of the policy by Alberta Premier Jason Kenney is misplaced as 
he pushes for the pipeline and against the carbon tax, a full scale crony policy. The proper policy mix is both the 
pipeline and the proper carbon tax.   
27 Marcel Boyer and Maria Kouyoumijian, Water on Wall Street, forthcoming 2021, ≈225 pages.  
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managers and operators of natural freshwater resources; commercial and industrial water and 
ancillary service providers; operators of water and wastewater treatment plants or centres; and 
developers of technologies and equipment for the exploitation, transportation, and 
management of water resources. 
The greatest danger on the horizon is that, through a lack of understanding, leadership, and 
open communication, the international community of developed and developing countries will 
lag in designing and implementing the governance mechanisms needed to manage our 
freshwater resources, however abundant or scarce. Time is running out. The global water crisis 
is imminent and as critical as climate change if not more, but far fewer resources are devoted to 
it.   
Clearly, water is both a human right and an economic commodity with very special 
characteristics: Its consumption momentarily destroys the good (the glass of water I drink is 
unavailable to anyone else, so water is a private good in the economic sense of the term), but 
the water consumed regenerates and eventually finds its way back into nature to be consumed 
again and again in an unending cycle. Identifying and delivering the right balance between these 
two necessarily complementary visions, water as a human right and water as a commodity with 
special characteristics, involves untangling a Gordian knot that humanity must address today.  
It is precisely because access to water is a human right that appropriate markets and 
commercial arrangements (pricing and control) must be designed to make this right a reality for 
all, rather than just a pipe dream. 
We must ask questions that some still find extremely disconcerting: If water is considered a 
shared endowment, how can we keep it from being over-exploited and over-consumed (the 
tragedy of the commons)? If water is assigned its due value, how can we avoid the opposite 
problem, in which it is underused because some rights holders withhold it from the market 
(tragedy of the anticommons)? How much should users pay for water (and wastewater 
treatment)? How to determine the “right” price? How is water scarcity managed in practice? 
How can trade facilitate the transformation of a water-poor country into a country capable of 
managing its local water in a sustainable if not self-sufficient manner? 
Boyer and Kouyoumijian explore market instruments that can be developed and applied to 
water resources. This may be the most audacious challenge of all, as the creation of competitive 
water markets could be a first step toward a more prosperous era for everyone: individuals and 
the agricultural, industrial, and residential sectors of the economy. At the forefront are water 
management technologies that can support the value chain, including dikes and dams, 
transportation, and desalination plants. 
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Consumers of commodities, including water, respond to prices: Lower prices lead to higher 
demand. When water is free, there is no reason to conserve or minimize the amount of water 
used. Where water is scarce, providing water for free is a recipe for ensuring that demand 
exceeds supply. 
Maintaining water markets can be difficult. Potable water distribution and wastewater 
collection systems are natural monopolies because it is not possible to build several parallel 
networks of pipes, as competition would require.28 However, monopolies, whether private or 
public, do not work well. They are rarely efficient, effective, or sensitive to the wishes of their 
customers and may overcharge because there is no competition to set a market price. 
But going to the other extreme, setting the price of water at zero or artificially low, also causes 
distortions. If there is no market to set the price, adequate regulation can ensure that the price 
reflects the opportunity cost and is thus the best possible approximation to the dynamics of 
supply and demand. 
Whatever the case may be, the regulation of drinking water must be independent and free of 
conflicts of interest. In an ideal system, operation of water treatment plants and pipelines will 
be separated from systems oversight, which in turn will be separated from creation of the rules 
and standards with which the system must comply. We know how to do all of that. 
But many books and documentaries, as well as political organizations, NGOs and lobbies, 
present an apocalyptic and ultimately dystopian vision of the use of market and commercial 
mechanisms (pricing and markets) to help alleviate the impending global water shortage. To 
these authors and leaders, this recourse to market mechanisms and the commodification of 
water is nothing less than the embodiment of evil, designed to enslave the whole world.  
In Canada, for example, Maude Barlow and the militants of the Council of Canadians have taken 
it upon themselves to block any opening to market mechanisms by wrapping themselves in the 
flag and using (exploiting) many young children in their advertising campaigns, asserting that 
the right to water is certainly a universal human right, but not access to OUR Canadian water. As 
one of the members put it: “Water is best used where God put it.”29 Fortunately for Canadians, 
God put a lot of water in Canada! 
They are oblivious to the fact that we are all increasingly in the same boat in the face of water 
shortages, and that the division should not be between those who have a surplus of water and 
those who suffer from shortages, but rather between those who advocate a reasoned use and 
                                                                
28 But this does not necessarily apply to the providers of drinking water or used water treatment. 
29 Paraphrasing Chronic Disbelief (10 April 2017) : “God doesn’t exist. Engage with reality and fix your fucking water 
laws.” https://ifunny.co/picture/because-god-doesn-t-exist-engage-with-reality-and-fix-6PeVsvMj4       
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an incentive-based protection of water resources associated with effective and equitable 
sharing (trade) and those who deny the reality of the urgent needs of humanity beyond their 
borders while proffering hollow platitudes.  
The political lobbying of this self-righteous coalition borders on extreme forms of policy 
collusion and cronyism. It has no other solution to offer than to repeat clichés and falsehoods 
about competition and markets, caricaturing their limitations as reflecting their true nature, in 
order to virtually take over the water resources and in so doing create a tragedy of the 
anticommons that hurts citizens both here and abroad.     
2.3 The value of life 
Some people are shocked by the idea that you can put a price on a human life. But for 
economists, it is obvious that life has a price, not so much in absolute as in relative terms, as an 
extension of the notion of limited resources. A person who boards an airplane or leaves home 
for a pizza is aware that there is some chance that the plane will crash or that she will be struck 
by a car and die. If this person still takes the plane or decides to go out and get her favourite 
pizza, she is accepting the low but non-nil risk of losing her life. This indicates that, to her, the 
value of her life (V) times the probability (p) that she will lose it, in expectation p*V, is lower 
than the value (W) of the plane trip or her consumption of a pizza: therefore p*V < W or V < 
W/p, where W and p are obviously functions of the activity considered. To the extent that the 
value W is based on competitive prices, the value of life, as revealed by our choices, is based on 
these prices and can therefore be qualified as a competitive value.  
Economists Christian Gollier and James Hammitt (2020)30 write (translation):  
“Because we are not willing to sacrifice everything to increase our life 
expectancy, it means that our life has value, and that value is finite. Since 
consciousness is the art of decision-making, and since decision-making is the art 
of comparing values, human beings have no choice but to give a relative value to 
everything. There is simply no alternative. The sage who refuses to commit may 
be honourable, but he abandons the decision-maker to abyss of his choices. 
Many people associate the idea of the value of life with the idea of the 
commodification of life. Yet many things have value without being associated 
with a market or the possibility of trade. These include friendship, blood and 
organ donations, even admiring a beautiful landscape… In order to partially 
remove this ethical baggage, the Belgian economist Jacques Drèze and the 
                                                                
30 Christian Gollier and James Hammitt (2020), “Coronavirus: Nous ne sommes pas prêts à tout sacrifier pour 
augmenter notre espérance de vie,” Tribune, Le Monde, April 3rd.  
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American economist Thomas Schelling (Nobel Prize in Economics, 2005) have 
developed the concept of the ‘value of a statistical life’ (VSL), by examining not 
the value of life per se, but the value of reducing the risk of losing one’s life. If I 
am willing to pay 1000 euros to reduce my probability of dying tomorrow by 
0.1%, this means that I impute a VSL of 1 million euros to my remaining life. 
Choosing a professional occupation that is less hazardous to one’s health or 
buying a home in a less polluted community are similarly part of this probabilistic 
reasoning. There are, of course, moral imperatives, such as justice and 
fundamental rights, which must transcend our individual preferences. The VSL of 
the rich is higher, but their euros also have a lower social value, so that all lives 
are valuable from the point of view of the community.”  
In public health an approach that has gained more currency than the value of a statistical 
life (VSL) is the value of a statistical year or quality-adjusted life years (QALY).31 
We decide to earmark a certain amount of the government budget (B) to healthcare because 
we believe that allocating B+$1M to it, which would provide for a certain additional or 
“marginal” reduction in mortality, is worth less to society than spending the $1M elsewhere, for 
example on education or support for the arts. Once again, these choices reveal a “competitive” 
or, in this case, rather a “public policy” value of human life.  
This analysis can be applied in an intertemporal context. Consider pharmaceutical patents, for 
example. If they were abolished, drug prices would fall and lives could be saved today. However, 
this would potentially reduce the profitability of the research laboratories that represent the 
capacity to deal with the pandemics of tomorrow. Abolishing patents could undermine our 
ability to deal with a future pandemic. Saving lives today means letting more people die in the 
future when a pandemic hits. Nothing is more certain than the high probability of future 
pandemics! The choice: to save lives tomorrow, we must sacrifice lives today. Ensuring the 
protection of pharmaceutical patents (determining the budget for pharmaceutical research) is a 
trade-off between present and future lives.  
Any discussion of budgetary allocations, in road infrastructure, education, foreign aid, etc., 
implicitly involves a financial valuation of human lives potentially saved or sacrificed.  
Not realizing this, or refusing to consider it, is equivalent to burying one’s head in the sand. 
Choices must be made. These choices, both individual and collective, reveal the value “at the 
margin” of the alternatives, sometimes in terms of lives at stake. This is what economists 
                                                                




fundamentally mean with allocating scarce resources to unlimited needs. It is in this light that 
the definition of economics as “the dismal science”32 takes on its full meaning. 
2.4 Ethical Behaviour (Collaboration, Concertation, Competition) 
Kantian economics33 is another approach to the characterization of ethical behaviour in 
economics. Jean-Jacques Laffont (1975)34 writes:  
“To give substance to the concept of a new ethics, we postulate that a 
typical agent assumes (according to Kant’s moral) that the other agents will 
act as he does and he maximizes his utility function under this new 
constraint… To induce people to behave in a “Kantian” way may be a very 
good solution to some problems, and the relevance of such a policy is 
connected to the existence of macro-economic constraints… We can expect 
to realize the positive aspects of Kantian behaviour even when the social 
interest is, to some reasonable degree, in conflict with private interest. The 
argument indicates why it should be possible with some hope of success to 
ask people to make non-financial sacrifices such as efforts to put rubbish in 
bins and to save energy.” 
Laurence Kotlikoff (2011)35 proposed a three-point program to end the last recession (2008–
2010) and possibly eliminate recessions. The program is, in a sense, derived from the Kantian 
economy, as presented or interpreted by Jean-Jacques Laffont. But before delving into it, we 
need to set the stage of that recession.36  
Remarkable developments in modern finance have led to a significant decrease in the level of 
systematic risk we face. This reduction in risk has been achieved by increasing the scope for 
diversification as a result of the globalization of financial markets. It has also benefited from the 
                                                                
32 Thomas Carlyle (1849). “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, 
Vol. XL., p. 672. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.30000080778727&view=1up eq=692. Also see 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dismalscience.asp. 
33 Kantian economics can be encapsulated as an economy based on Kant's categorical imperative: "Act only according 
to the maxim that you can also want this maxim to become a universal law". 
34 Jean-Jacques Laffont (1975). “Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics: An Introduction to 
Kantian Economics,” Economica 42 (168), pp. 430–437. For more informatioan about Kantian Ethics, also see Mark 
White, Kantian Ethics and Economics (2011), Stanford Univ. Press; John E. Roemer (2012), “Kantian Economics, Social 
Ethos, and Pareto Efficiency,” Cowles Foundation #1854; Ingela Alger and Jurgen Weibull (2013), “Homo Moralis – 
Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching,” Econometrica 81(6), 2269–2302. 
35 Laurence Kotlikoff (2011), “Five Prescriptions to Heal Economy’s Ills,” Bloomberg, September 27, 2011.  
36 See Marcel Boyer (2015), “Growing Out of Crisis and Recessions: Regulating Systemic Financial Institutions and 




development of novel risk management tools such as new insurance products, credit default 
swaps, and other derivatives. These developments have enabled economic agents to reduce the 
probability and severity of potential losses through more diversified and better targeted 
protection and hedging strategies, both prior and subsequent to problematic events. At the 
same time, these developments in modern finance have increased the potential severity of 
systemic risk, though its probability is now lower, because the interdependence of markets 
means that a potential crisis can only be global. 
Various financial innovations have allowed institutions and businesses to hold securities (asset-
backed commercial paper or other types) as profitable alternatives to traditional bank deposits. 
These are generally highly liquid and, as such, are treated as close to cash. Bank deposits as a 
percentage of GDP have declined rapidly around the world, from almost 18 per cent of GDP in 
1965 to less than 5 per cent in 2005 in the United States. What appeared as substantial 
efficiency gains in financial intermediation camouflaged a significant increase in the severity of 
systematic risk in the event of a crisis of confidence.  
When these securities lost their liquidity, a loss of confidence contagion spread and led to a 
devaluation of assets, which was in turn exacerbated by overly rigid mark-to-market rules. It 
was as if a large part of the money supply had suddenly disappeared, causing a liquidity crisis. 
This liquidity crunch resulted in a race for cash, and thus to a credit crisis and higher 
counterparty risk. 
Robert Lucas, winner of the 1995 Nobel Prize in Economics, and Nancy Stokey (2011)37 wrote:  
“What happened in September 2008 was a kind of bank run. Creditors of Lehman 
Brothers and other investment banks lost confidence in the ability of these banks 
to redeem short-term loans. One aspect of this loss of confidence was a 
precipitous decline in lending in the market for repurchase agreements, the repo 
market. Massive lending by the Fed resolved the financial crisis by the end of the 
year, but not before reductions in business and household spending had led to the 
worst U.S. recession since the 1930s.” 
The economic crisis was a crisis of confidence in one of the essential common infrastructures of 
our society, namely the financial system. Any company can be shut down, but it is hard to 
conceive of an economy without highways, communications systems, and an efficient and 
accessible financial system.  
                                                                
37 Robert E. Lucas and Nancy L. Stokey (2011), “Liquidity Crises - Understanding sources and limiting consequences: 
A theoretical framework,” Economic Policy Paper 11-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, May 2011. 
30 
 
Despite the interventions of central banks, there was a widespread loss of confidence and fear 
that an economic collapse was imminent. Banks, like many other businesses, sought to 
consolidate their reserves and shore up their capital, tightening the terms of credit (higher 
borrowing costs and credit rationing) in a context where counterparty risk, and thus risk 
premiums, had risen considerably. 
This crisis, which started with subprime mortgages, spread to all asset-backed securities, 
jeopardizing providers of insurance, or reinsurance, of municipal and real estate bonds. The final 
blow came when interbank lending—which is at the heart of the financial system—dried up as 
banks stopped trusting each other and started hoarding funds to stave off bankruptcy. Central 
banks reacted by injecting unprecedented sums into a record number of banks, accepting an 
unusually diverse spectrum of assets as collateral for loans. 
The monetary base increased from a normal level of $845 billion (109) on September 10, 2008 to 
$1.476 trillion (1012) on November 12, 2008 and $1.742 trillion (1012) on January 14, 2009. 
Owing to the collapse of the repo interbank market, total reserves held at the Fed by deposit-
taking financial institutions reached an astronomical 20 times their normal level between 
September 2008 and January 2009.  
The big banks became wary of each other when their management realized that risks were as 
badly managed in other banks as in their own! 
Trust is a particularly important type of capital in the financial sector, based primarily on 
promises and the rule of law: Bank deposits are not worth much unless depositors are 
convinced that they can withdraw their funds whenever they want. More generally, trust is the 
most critical form of social capital—making possible a significant reduction in a variety of 
transaction costs within a society. Trust is a form of both private and social capital. As such, 
fostering and sustaining it involves serious coordination and incentivization challenges.  
Robert Shiller (2010), winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2013, writes38: 
“Achieving the proper economic spirit does not mean cheerleading by 
government officials to try to boost confidence. It does not mean groundless 
promises that the economy will recover. It means instead creating the kinds 
of conditions that will give people a salient reason for confidence. It means 
making ready to give economic stimulus as needed, and only as needed, to 
rescue collapsing institutions. Economic stimulus must not be overdone so 
                                                                
38 Robert Shiller (2010), “Stimulus and Regulation to Promote a Renewed and Spirited World Economy,” United 
Nations, October 2010. 
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that it encourages bubble thinking. Achieving the proper economic spirit 
also means establishing regulations that ensure trust and cooperation, and 
in so doing, that encourage genuine inspiration. It means promoting an 
atmosphere of fair dealing in business.” 
To the extent that this social trust capital is the upshot of corporations’ and individuals’ 
behaviour in terms of their private trust capital, it is essential that its development be framed 
and fostered by appropriate regulations. The burden of these regulations will be lessened to the 
extent that managers embody and share values of honesty and intellectual rigour, not only in 
the production of goods and services but also in the production and transmission of information 
to all their partners. These values of probity will be all the more present and widespread as the 
regulations promoting them are effective and rigorous. 
Exiting a bad Nash equilibrium 
More often than not, a recession is the result of what game theorists call a suboptimal Nash 
equilibrium: Each economic agent (firms, financial institutions, households, etc.) refrains from 
hiring, spending, producing, or investing as the best-response strategy to similar strategies 
adopted by other agents. Why should firms and households spend and invest if they cannot find 
buyers for their goods and services, when they limit their own spending and investment out of 
fear that their goods and services will not find buyers? The economy is thus mired in this 
perpetual vicious circle of a Nash equilibrium that is both suboptimal and stable, in which all 
agents are acting rationally. 
Although the rational decisions of agents are all interrelated in this suboptimal equilibrium, 
there is another equilibrium in which firms and households spend and invest because they 
rationally believe that other agents, firms, and households will do the same. This optimal 
equilibrium cannot be attained by a simple unilateral change in strategy of a single agent or sub-
group of agents. Only a concerted effort and simultaneous action by all agents can generate the 
kind of expectations and decisions desired by each, leading to expanded hiring and sustainable 
growth. 
This is where Laurence Kotlikoff’s three-point program comes into play. The goal is to help or 
stimulate a rapid exit from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium in which the economy is (rationally) 
mired in a recession. The three points are as follows:    
Point 1: Banks may be reluctant to lend their available funds because they are concerned about 
the state of the economy and the ability of borrowers to make their payments. However, if the 
Central Bank could use a variety of instruments to convince banks to lend to businesses that 
would normally be able to meet their obligations without too many problems, they would 
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collectively help to generate normal economic conditions. But Bank A will only cooperate if all 
banks do. This is a coordination problem that Kantian ethics can help resolve. Bankers (and 
other financial players) are in the best position to identify companies and projects in which to 
invest. The Central Bank could play a major role in initiating and fostering the desired Kantian 
behaviour by encouraging banks to lend to these companies. 
Point 2: Unemployment is very high in a recession. To reduce this rate to a level close to the 
normal observed when business conditions are sound, many jobs must be created or restored—
as many as seven or eight per cent of total jobs. This, combined with the associated multiplier 
effect, would reduce the unemployment rate to its normal level. The Government could 
persuade workers and the shareholders and owners of medium and large businesses to 
voluntarily hire 7.5 per cent more workers and to do their utmost to maintain this level of 
employment. How to pay these new workers? Existing employees could be offered and accept a 
7.5 per cent pay cut in exchange for shares (or equivalent) of equal value in their company. 
Existing workers would thus finance the new hires in a show of solidarity, but in the final 
analysis the business owners would foot the bill. All companies thus solicited, knowing that all 
other similar companies will recruit and considering the ripple effects on the rest of the 
economy, will rationally anticipate that there will indeed be a greater demand for the additional 
goods and services that their new employees will produce. In the final analysis, company 
valuations increase, allowing the owners to recuperate the values of their assets and securities, 
and everything returns to normal. 
Point 3: In times of recession, big companies are usually sitting on large unused investment 
budgets (liquidity). They are waiting for the economy to improve before investing, but the 
economy will not improve until they all (or most of them) invest at the same (or almost the 
same) time. The Head of Government can help solve this problem by convening a meeting of 
the CEOs of the largest companies and persuading them to collectively commit to resuming or 
even doubling their investments over the next three years. If all or most of them commit to this 
type of program, they would immediately create much of the demand needed to make their 
investments worthwhile and profitable. 
Kantian ethical behaviour, resulting from an appropriate coordination effort rationally adopted 
by individuals and companies in a context of competitive markets, is likely to enable the 
economy to move out of a bad Nash equilibrium. Properly regulated competitive markets help 
to restore and generate the trust capital that was undermined by the recession.  
2.5 Fair and Equitable Compensation: the music industry 
Fair and equitable compensation equals competitive wages and salaries—to wit, compensation 
that is consistent with the interests of both suppliers of labour or human capital services and 
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the demanders or employers of these services—in a context in which both suppliers and 
demanders act without external constraint: “willing buyer, willing seller.” The best guarantee 
that suppliers will be adequately remunerated for their labour lies in competition for these 
services. And the best guarantee that demanders will pay appropriate compensation lies in the 
competition between suppliers of labour services. Thus, competitive compensation is basically 
synonymous to fair and equitable compensation because it respects the interests of both 
suppliers and demanders of labour services.  
At competitive equilibrium, compensation is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of work, i.e. 
the value that would be produced by the work provided if it were employed in the best available 
and accessible alternative activity, including leisure. In competitive equilibrium, compensation is 
also equal to the value of the marginal output generated by the effort provided. Equality of the 
value of the marginal opportunity cost of labour with its marginal productivity is the main 
feature of competitive equilibrium. This is what makes competitive compensation fair and 
equitable.  
The value of my work is determined`on markets by my fellow citizens, who estimate the 
contribution my work generates (in its best possible employment) in terms of utility or the value 
of goods and services. In this competitive setting, my competitive compensation would increase 
if and only if I could produce more with my work (productivity) or produce goods and services of 
greater value to my fellow citizens.  
There is nothing more stressful and demoralizing than being told or finding out that our work 
and efforts are not producing anything of value or interest to our fellow citizens and are 
therefore valueless. However, this can also provide an incentive to change our portfolio of skills 
and the basket of goods and services we produce or contribute to producing.      
Few sectors experience the same degree of scrutiny as the music sector. Let us take a look at 
this industry, where the compensation of authors, composers, performers, musicians, and 
producers poses significantly more complex challenges than we encounter in the vast majority 
of industries and markets. The advent of the digital age has transformed the industry to such an 
extent that some even claim that music is spearheading the development of the Internet.  
Determining the competitive value of music copyright lies at the heart of these challenges. This 
is the most pressing issue facing industries based on intellectual property rights—copyright, 
patent, trademark—today.  
Three principles govern the challenge of copyright pricing and compensation. First is the 
principle of fair competition, which states that all uses of musical works and sound recordings, 
in physical or digital form, should compete on a level playing field for their customers and 
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consumers while accounting for users’ and distributors’ different business models: the same 
price for similar uses, different but compatible prices for different uses. Second is the principle 
of competitive market value, or “willing buyer, willing seller,” which stipulates that 
compensation to the owners of the rights must be efficient and effective in order to achieve a 
fair and equitable balance for both users and the creators who own these rights. Third is the 
principle of efficient pricing of informational goods and assets, which says that users should 
have access to, if not consume, virtually all available musical works of both the present and the 
past, given that these musical works are permanent, i.e. not destroyed by consumption. 
Informational goods are public assets in the economic sense, but with a particular cost 
structure: A relatively high cost of the first copy and a low or zero marginal cost of additional 
uses through reproduction and dissemination.  
Competitive copyright pricing in this context seeks to achieve a balance between the rights of 
copyright holders and the rights of users by providing appropriate compensation to creators for 
the assets they create and to professional users for the costs and risks they incur, all the while 
protecting consumer’s rights with appropriate, if not maximum, dissemination of musical 
creations. To achieve competitive prices, the currently prevalent heuristic approach needs to be 
replaced with a more thorough analysis. Although they dominate current approaches to 
determining royalty rates in virtually all institutional contexts, these historical heuristics are of 
little use for finding the competitive value. 
They have the advantage of simplicity, to the point that it is easy to overlook their mostly 
arbitrary origins. They are fundamentally path dependent, meaning heavily reliant on historical 
values: What has happened in the past persists because of resistance to change—which in turn 
reflects the caution of decision-makers in the absence of information or in the presence of 
disruptive information—giving rise to a suboptimal equilibrium that persists despite the 
existence of better alternatives. 
Current procedures for determining royalties are based primarily on rules of thumb whose 
foundations in theoretical and applied economics are relatively weak and clearly inadequate to 
meeting the challenges of assigning a competitive value to music copyright. 
The two fundamental questions confronting us are: First, what is the competitive value of 
copyright in view of the “informational good” aspect of protected works (music and books) and 
the advent of digitization, which makes the emergence of competitive markets more difficult, if 
not impossible? Second, how can the right of creators to equitable (competitive) compensation 
and the right of users to the benefits of digital technologies be balanced at a time when 
digitization is bringing the cost of dissemination down to almost zero and, in so doing, making 
the conflict between the rights of users and right holders more pronounced than ever? 
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The fair value of music and the resulting fair compensation of creators corresponds to what 
would be paid on competitive markets. When considering whether to use a unit of an asset or 
factor, consumers compare the (marginal) utility or value derived from the use of the unit to the 
market price and proceed with the purchase only if the former exceeds the latter. Similarly, 
sellers compare the (marginal) cost of producing the good and making it available with the 
market price, only agreeing to produce and sell the marginal unit only if this cost is less than or 
equal to the price. More generally, when there are several buyers and sellers, a competitive 
equilibrium is a situation (price and quantity) in which upward and downward pressures on both 
price and quantity cancel each other to the satisfaction of both buyers (demand) and sellers 
(supply), all of whom freely and willingly participate in the market. 
Therefore, a price that corresponds to a competitive market price or a price properly negotiated 
between well-informed parties will necessarily balance the interests of creators and users, since 
all investments, costs (including opportunity costs), risks, and benefits derived will be 
incorporated into the demand and supply equations. Given this price, buyers derive maximum 
value from using the good or input and sellers are properly and fairly compensated for their 
costs, with each party being free to accept the transaction. 
However, as mentioned above, musical works are different from standard products like apples 
or cars. They are informational goods. Differences in cost structures, i.e. the cost of entry and 
fixed and variable costs that depend on audience size, argue for differentiated royalty formulas 
across different industries, although these industries compete to some extent for subscribers 
and listeners’ ears.39 
2.6 Inequalities (income, wealth, consumption): their mesure and their role 
The nature of the links between the creation, distribution, and redistribution of wealth is a 
recurring debate in democracies, whether social democratic or not. These links are complex, but 
not necessarily incompatible, if we take care to understand their determinants.  
Let us begin by recalling that wealth creation and increased productivity do not fall from heaven 
in divine bounty but are the result of the actions, research, and thinking of creators, innovators, 
                                                                
39 For more complegte analyses of this issue, see Marcel Boyer and Anne Catherine Faye (2018), “Music Royalty 
Rates for Different Business Models: Lindahl Pricing and Nash Bargaining,” In: Marciano A., Ramello G. (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. See also Marcel Boyer (2019), “The Three-Legged 
Stool of Music Value: Hertzian Radio, SiriusXM, Spotify,” pp. 13–40 in Ysolde Gendreau (ed.), Le Droit d’Auteur en 
Action : Perspectives Internationales sur les Recours / Copyright in Action: International Perspectives on Remedies / 
El Derecho de Autor en Acción: Perspectivas Internationales sobre los Medios de Protección, Proceedings of the 
2018 World Congress of ALAI (Alliance littéraire et artistique internationale), Éditions Thémis, Montréal, 490 pages 
(See http://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2018s-32.pdf for the most complete version of the working paper). 
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and entrepreneurs who succeed in producing more goods and services of greater value with the 
available resources (labour, materials, environment, capital).  
Let us also remember that the distribution of wealth is much more egalitarian in developed 
countries and it has become more egalitarian as the level of development increased between 
1920 and 1980 (7 decades), before becoming more unequal after 1980 ( 4 decades). Although 
most of the media and public attention is focused on this last period (40 years), we cannot 
understand the reasons and offer an explanation for this increase if we do not also understand 
the reasons for the previous decrease over 70 years. If the reasons given to explain the increase 
in inequalities since 1980 (40 years) cannot explain the decrease over the period before 1980 
(70 years), it is because the explanations suggested are incomplete or false.  
Moreover, wealth that is created in an economy or society is distributed and captured by wages 
and salaries, corporate profits, interest and investment income, net farm income, and taxes 
minus subsidies (governments). Thus, we need to bear three important facts in mind: The share 
of labour compensation in Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) has fluctuated slightly around 
50 per cent for several decades. In Canada, it went from 52 per cent (1986) to 51 per cent 
(1995), 50 per cent (2006) and 51 per cent in 2017. In that year it was 51 per cent in Alberta, 52 
per cent in Ontario and 53 per cent in Quebec. Overall, in real terms, compensation to labour 
has therefore increased at the same rate as GDP—some 135 per cent between 1981 and 2017. 
Employment income is only one source of revenues for individuals and households, since 
businesses belong to them, too.40  
The issue of the inequality in a society, as well as its determinants and evolution over time, is a 
recurring theme of major research efforts in academic and public policy circles. Along with calls 
for the reform of capitalism, this issue is the focus of persistent discussion in the opinion pages 
of newspapers and magazines and on social media platforms. 
One galvanizing element is certainly the fact that, this year, the mean (median) income of CEOs 
of large corporations is 281 (170) times the median income of their employees (see below). 
Similarly, in the arts and sports the income distribution has recently become more unequal.  
                                                                
40 Particularly, portfolios of shares in public enterprises such as (in Canada) la Caisse de dépôt et placement du 
Québec, Canadian Public Sector Pensions, Alberta Investment Management Corporation and British Columbia 
Investment Management Corporation, as well as those of the Fonds de travailleurs (Fonds de solidarité FTQ and 
Fondaction CSN) belong to taxpayers and workers who receive the dividends. It is similar in many countries. 
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In music, according to Thomson (2014),41 the top 1 per cent of groups and solo artists derive 77 
per cent of all revenues from recorded music. According to Kruger (2013),42 the top 1 per cent 
of performers captured 26 per cent of all concert revenues in 1982 vs. 56 per cent in 2003, while 
the top 5 per cent captured almost 90 per cent of all concert revenues. Lunny (2019)43 states 
that in 2019, the top 1 per cent captured 60 per cent of revenues. 
In sports, according to Zingales (2010),44 the purse earned by the winner of the Masters golf 
tournament in 2008 equalled 103 times the annual salary of a groundskeeper, compared to 3 
times in 1948. However, if this value is translated into expected earnings, it drops from 103 to 
13 because the number of golfers has increased significantly and the competition has become 
global. Zingales adds: “The golf example is illuminating because the same two phenomena that 
are driving the rise in golf prizes—enhanced competition and the increased value of being at the 
top—have also occurred in the corporate world, roughly at the same time. Increased integration 
of the global market makes it more difficult for companies to survive. In turn, a lot of executives 
who would have earned a decent living running mediocre companies are wiped out. At the 
same time, the most efficient firms can apply their advantage over the entire world market 
now. The value of being the best has increased disproportionately, and companies – just like the 
Augusta Golf Club – are not going to run the risk of losing the jackpot to save a few dollars on 
the executives.”45 
                                                                
41 Derek Thomson (2014), “The Shazam Effect,” The Atlantic, December 2014. The author writes also “Even when 
offered a universe of music, most of us prefer to listen to what we think everyone else is hearing!” 
42 Alan Kruger (2013), “Land of Hope and Dreams: Rock and Roll, Economics and Rebuilding the Middle Class,” Rock 
& Roll Hall of Fame, Cleveland (OH), June 12 2013. 
43 Oisin Lunny (2019), “Record breaking revenues in the music business, but are musicians getting a raw deal?”, 
FORBES, May 15 2019. 
44 Luigi Zingales (2012), A Capitalism for the People, Basic Books 2012, page 20–25. The data is from 2008. It probably 
kept increasing during the last decade and more. 
45 These developments in the magnitude of purses in the area of sports reminds us of Joseph A. 
Schumpeter’s (1942) “spectacular prizes,” Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd Edition (Kindle 
1699–1710), Wilder Publications): “Prizes and penalties …. are not proffered at random; yet there is a 
sufficiently enticing mixture of chance: the game is not like roulette, it is more like poker. They are 
addressed to ability, energy, and supernormal capacity for work; but if there were a way of measuring 
either that ability in general or the personal achievement that goes into any particular success, the 
premiums actually paid out would probably not be found proportional to either. Spectacular prizes much 
greater than would have been necessary to call forth the particular effort are thrown to a small minority 
of winners, thus propelling much more efficaciously than a more equal and more ‘just’ distribution 
would, the activity of that large majority of businessmen who receive in return very modest 
compensation or nothing or less than nothing, and yet do their utmost because they have the big prizes 
before their eyes and overrate their chances of doing equally well.” Ejan Mackaay, Stéphane Rousseau, 
Pierre Larouche, and Alain Parent, Analyse économique du droit, Paris, Dalloz et Montréal, Éditions 
Thémis (3rd edition, forthcoming, 2020) write: “In the middle of the last century Schumpeter reviewed 
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A possible contributor is the combined effect of an increase in the size and complexity of 
companies and the winner-take-all “tournaments” that have arisen under globalization: Where 
there used to be two, three, or more CEOs, there is now only one, and where there were more 
winners in more (local) tournaments, there are fewer winners in fewer large tournaments. 
As we read in Freeland (2012):46 
“The average tenure of a Fortune 500 CEO has fallen from 9.5 years to 3.5 
years over the past decade. That’s true lower down the food chain, too. 
Thomas Philippon, the economist who documented the connection 
between deregulation and soaring salaries on Wall Street, also found that 
the jobs of financiers were very insecure. Nor does being your own boss 
protect you from the uncertainty of the markets. At a 2011 seminar at the 
Central European University in Budapest devoted to the psychology of 
investing, George Soros told the gathered academics that ‘the markets are 
a machine for destroying the ego’.” 
However, a closer inspection is in order before becoming too excited about the increase in 
income and wealth inequality. On this subject, Watson (2015)47 writes: 
“Our preoccupation with inequality is an error and a trap. It is an error 
because inequality, unlike poverty, is not the problem it is so widely 
presumed to be. Inequality can be good, it can be bad, and it can be 
neither good nor bad but benign… Inequality is also a trap – not a trap 
anyone has set for us but one of our own making – because concern with 
it leads us to focus on the top end of the income distribution when our 
preoccupation should instead be the bottom where the bulk of human 
misery almost certainly resides.” 
Amartya Sen (2001)48 asks us to remember that 
                                                                
the conditions necessary for the innovative activity of entrepreneurs. He concluded that, owing to the 
great uncertainty inherent in inventive activity and the small number of successes, only windfall gains 
are likely to provide sufficient incentive. These profits must far exceed the returns that would attract 
merchants to regular business activities.” (Author’s translation).  
46 Christina Alexandra ‘Chrystia’ Freeland (2012), Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of 
Everyone Else, Doubleday Canada.  
47 William Watson (2015), The Inequality Trap: Fighting Capitalism instead of Poverty, University of Toronto Press. 




“Pervasive poverty and lives that were ‘nasty, brutish and short,’ as 
Thomas Hobbes put it, dominated the world not many centuries ago, with 
only a few pockets of rare affluence. In overcoming that penury, modern 
technology as well as economic interrelations have been influential. The 
predicament of the poor across the world cannot be reversed by 
withholding from them the great advantages of contemporary 
technology, the well-established efficiency of international trade and 
exchange, and the social as well as economic merits of living in open, 
rather than closed, societies. What is needed is a fairer distribution of the 
fruits of globalization.” 
Consumption inequality 
In a recent working paper,49 I outline the main features of the evolution of income and wealth 
inequalities over time (since 1920), and take issue with the current fixation on these inequalities 
rather than the more socially relevant consumption inequality. These consumption inequalities 
have shrunk considerably in recent decades, for which relatively reliable data exist, and 
probably for a much longer period of time. 
Levels of income and wealth inequality declined between 1920 and 1980, but this trend 
reversed between 1980 and today (with recent signs of a possible correction). Consumption 
inequality, arguably the most socially relevant form of inequality, has most likely declined over 
this period, although data on a reasonably inclusive measure of consumption are lacking. 
However, we are beginning to see the emergence of this type of measure for a period spanning 
the last two decades, with Statistics Canada leading the way. An important factor has been the 
development of social transfers in-kind (STiK), which significantly top-up resources: equivalent 
to about 80 per cent of disposable income for the bottom quintile and about 10 per cent for the 
top quintile. Their impact on consumption inequalities is significant. 
The key results can be summarized as follows. In Canada, employment income of the lowest 
(highest) quintile of households increased by 49.0 per cent (72.7 per cent) between 1999 and 
2018. The ratio of the highest to the lowest employment income by household quintile 
increased by 21.3 per cent, indicating an increase in this measure of inequality. 
Net transfers in dollars, which subtract taxes paid from transfers received, are positive for the 
poorest household quintile, having increased by 100.4 per cent between 1999 and 2018, and 
                                                                
49 Marcel Boyer (2019), “Inequalities: Income, Wealth, and Consumption,” 44p., CIRANO 2020s-26 




negative for the richest quintile, with net taxes growing 57 per cent over the same period. The 
difference between the lowest and highest quintile in terms of net transfers increased by 61.9 
per cent from $45 656 in 1999 to $73 932 in 2018. This translates into a reduction in overall 
income inequality measured in a way that includes all income sources. 
The total effect of changes in income (employment, mixed, and real estate) and net transfers in 
dollars means that, between 1999 and 2018, household disposable income of the bottom 
quintile increased by 62.8 per cent, while that of the top quintile increased by 74.9 per cent, 
resulting in a 4.8 per cent increase in income inequality as measured by the ratio of disposable 
incomes of the two quintiles. 
Final consumption expenditures of households increased by 116.9 per cent for the bottom 
quintile and by 70.3 per cent for the top quintile, indicating a significant decline in final 
consumption inequality.  
Social transfers in kind (STiK)50 increased by 84.7 per cent for the lowest household quintile and 
by 80.8 per cent for the highest quintile between 1999 and 2018. The ratio of the highest to the 
lowest quintile’s STiK remained close to one in absolute terms for the period 1999–2018. 
Summing up household final consumption expenditures (HFCE) and social transfers in kind 
(STiK) gives household actual final consumption (HAFC). Between 1999 and 2018, this final 
consumption increased by 106.8 per cent for households in the lowest quintile and by 71.6 
per cent for households in the highest quintile, translating into a significant decrease in 
consumption inequalities between these quintiles. 
The compensation of CEOs 
In another recent working paper,51 I discuss the relative earnings of CEOs, which, as mentioned 
above, is at the centre of discussions on inequality. From data on the 500 largest (S&P500) 
companies compiled by Bloomberg from company reports filed with the Securities Exchange 
                                                                
50 STiK (or social transfers in kind) correspond to expenditures made on behalf of households by 
governmental bodies or non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). STiK complement concepts 
related to both consumption and income. We might want to conceptualize STiK as income in the form of 
services. Treating STiK as a supplementary form of income lets us calculate household adjusted 
disposable income (HADI)—this allows us to report household income in a different form. Observe that 
the concepts of HAFC (household adjusted final consumption) and HADI (household adjusted disposable 
income) are the internationally recommended measures of consumption and income. 
51 Marcel Boyer (2019), “CEO Pay in Perspective,” CIRANO 2019s–33, 52 pages. 





Commission (SEC), we find that the mean income of CEOs of these large companies was US$14.2 
million, and the median income was US$12.4 million, in 2018–19. The average CEO pay ratio, 
defined as the ratio of the CEO’s compensation to the median salary of the company’s 
employees, reached 281 last year. However, companies differ significantly in size and more 
representative ratios are the median CEO pay ratio, equal to 170, and the weighted average CEO 
pay ratio (measured as the total salaries paid to all CEOs divided by the total of all median 
salaries for the S&P 500 companies), equal to 185.  
While media coverage primarily focusses on the 281 ratio, it may not be the most informative 
and relevant measure of the gap between CEO compensation and the median salary in the 
company. Each of the 26 million employees at these 500 companies “contributes” an average of 
$273 to their CEO’s annual income, or about one-half of one per cent of their respective 
salaries, which I will refer to as the B-ratio. Viewed from a different angle, if we were to 
distribute the CEO’s salary equally among all employees, the resulting annual salary increase 
would be $273. Measured as a percentage of the employee’s salary, the resulting salary 
increase would be one-half of one per cent (0.50 per cent). 
These measures—the CEO pay ratio, CEO pay per employee, and the B-ratio—vary across 
companies and sectors. There are various reasons for this variability, including the importance 
and specificity of the position and importance or impact of the CEO’s leadership and skills in 
designing, implementing, and managing corporate strategies and actions. The strategic exercise 
of the company’s underlying real options has a significant impact on the company’s 
performance, profitability, and growth and, by extension, on the general well-being of its 
employees, shareholders, and other stakeholders, including suppliers and customers. This is 
generally defined and delivered by the CEO. But the role and importance of the CEO may differ 
from one company, industry, or country to the next. Understanding how and why is essential. 
The social role of inequality 
In a third working paper (forthcoming),52 I discuss the social role of income and wealth 
inequalities. I show that income and wealth inequalities can be understood as responding to 
three social needs or imperatives: the need to ensure an adequate level of savings and 
investment, the need to enable appropriate creative destruction through inventiveness, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship, and the need to foster the development and acquisition of 
new skills that are socially necessary but individually costly. These three social factors, which 
                                                                
52 Marcel Boyer, “The Social Role of Inequalities: Why significant inequality levels in income and wealth 
are important for our prosperity and collective wellbeing” (forthcoming). 
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require a certain (optimal) level of income and wealth inequality, promote higher levels of 
productivity, economic growth, and prosperity for all. 
In this upcoming working paper I develop the nature of these three factors or social imperatives. 
I define the social role of higher income and wealth groups as “saving and investing.” This social 
role of the rich has perhaps become more important in recent decades—maybe since 1980. But 
who among us should be entrusted with this role, which comes with great responsibilities but 
also with considerable perks? 
In the matter of wealth creation, a distinction must be made between the short and the long 
term. In times of accelerated wealth creation, the distribution temporarily becomes more 
unequal before reverting to a more egalitarian level. The new wealth is initially appropriated 
mainly by those who are primarily responsible for its creation. Next, a restructuring and 
reorganization of economic activities increases the productivity of human resources and 
promotes a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. Productivity is further enhanced by the 
development and acquisition of new skills, resulting in an even more egalitarian distribution. We 
may have reached a peak in income and wealth inequality in developed countries. Freeland 
(2012) reports that a group of economists interviewed by Alan Kruger in the mid-1990s cited 
technological change as the main factor in income polarization, followed by “unknown,” and 
globalization.  
Incentives to creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship are a principal and essential factor in 
economic development. They largely stem from the fact that the fruits of these talents and skills 
can be captured in the short term by those who are directly responsible for them, namely 
creators, innovators, and entrepreneurs. To capitalize on creations and innovations, human 
resources with superior training and skills are needed. In a phase of accelerated wealth creation 
such as the one we are currently experiencing, competitive pressure on these resources 
increases their value compared to the value of basic human capital, which is less well trained 
and therefore less skilled in the use of new production and organizational technologies. This is a 
powerful incentive to acquire these skills.  
In designing and implementing socially responsible redistribution policies, it must be top of 
mind that redistributing income and wealth can only be achieved in an efficient and sustainable 
way by enhancing individuals’ skill portfolios to increase their value on labor markets, and thus 
to their fellow citizens. It is by implementing institutions and mechanisms that promote 
ongoing, rapid, and orderly adaptation of skill portfolios that governments can best combine 
wealth creation with responsible and incentivizing income redistribution. This policy places 
greater demands on individuals and is thus less politically palatable, but it is the only policy that 
is socially responsible and compatible with sustained economic development. 
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The best way to redistribute wealth is to encourage everyone to participate in its creation. It 
must also be borne in mind that the biggest and most relevant social inequalities are in 
consumption. Although good data have not been available for very long, we have observed that 
consumption inequalities have decreased considerably in Canada, and probably globally, in the 
past two decades and most likely much longer.  
2.7 Socially Responsible Behaviors and Governance (ESG)  
Let us examine the ESG (environmental, social, governance) principles for a socially responsible 
economy (SRE) combining the principles of socially responsible investment (SRI) and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR).  
In July 2013, the Association française de la gestion financière (AFG) and the Forum pour 
l’investissement responsable (FIR) published a definition designed to clarify the role of SRI: “SRI 
(Socially Responsible Investment) is investment that strives to reconcile economic performance 
with social and environmental impact by financing companies and public entities that contribute 
to sustainable development regardless of their sector of activity. By exercising influence over 
governance and stakeholder behaviour, SRI promotes economic responsibility”53 (author’s 
translation). 
The association Finance Durable et Investissement Responsable (FDIR) “… finances and steers 
the work of the FDIR Chair (http://fdir.idei.fr/), created in the spring of 2007 on the initiative of 
the Association Française de la Gestion Financière (AFG), which plays an active role in its 
organization and development. The Chair promotes collaboration between asset management 
professionals and researchers whose work contributes to the international reputation of Paris’ 
financial centre on this essential topic” (author’s translation).54 
The Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) movement has given rise to a large industry with its 
managers and analysts, but also its problems of definition and criteria. Empirical data on the 
financial performance of SRI funds and on the impacts of corporate social responsibility, as 
implemented through the various mechanisms, policies, and strategies, remains difficult to 
characterize and measure, and therefore difficult to verify.  
According to the last report of the US SIF Foundation, ESG funds reached about $11,6 trillion 
(1012) in assets at the beginning of 2018, that is 25% of all assets under private management 






with a growth of 38% over two years.55 Moreover, Jon Hale (Morningstar, 2020)56 estimates that 
assets invested in ESG funds in the United States increased by 400 per cent in 2019. Leading 
asset managers have made significant commitments to ESG principles. BlackRock, the world’s 
largest asset manager, has announced that ESG criteria will be its “new standard” and has urged 
corporate CEOs to recognize that “Climate change has become a defining factor” in the long-
term prospects of their companies. State Street Global Advisors, the world’s third largest asset 
manager, contacted boards of directors to inform them that the ESG approach is no longer just 
an option for a long-term strategy, announcing that SSGA would use its proxy voting power to 
ensure that companies identify and incorporate ESG principles or criteria into their long-term 
strategies. Goldman Sachs GS said it intends to put $750 billion in ESG investments over the 
current decade. More and more investors are realizing that global warming is an impending 
crisis, accompanied by significant societal and financial risks, and that a long-term focus on 
creating value for all stakeholders will increase the value created for shareholders and society in 
the long term. The situation is similar in Europe.57  
The about-face of Business Roundtable58  is symptomatic of the changes that are occurring. 
Since 1978, Business Roundtable has periodically published principles of corporate governance, 
always reaffirming the primacy of shareholders. In August 2019, it changed course. It now 
affirms that the economy must enable everyone to thrive through work and creativity and to 
lead a life of meaning and dignity, and that the free market system remains the best way to 
achieve this, i.e. to create good jobs in a strong and sustainable economy, to foster innovation, 
to create a healthy environment and economic opportunities for all.  
Those CEOs affirm now that they share a fundamental commitment to all stakeholders in their 
respective companies. They have committed to delivering maximum value added to their 
customers; investing in their employees (offering a fair total compensation package, promoting 
the acquisition of new skills, encouraging diversity and inclusion, dignity and respect); treating 
their suppliers fairly and ethically; supporting the communities in which their companies are 
active by implementing ESG practices; and generating long-term value for their shareholders, 
who are the source of the capital necessary for investment, growth, and innovation. They affirm 
that all of their stakeholders and partners are essential and that they are committed to 
                                                                
55 US SIF Foundation, 2020 Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends. 
https://www.ussif.org/files/US%20SIF%20Trends%20Report%202018%20Release.pdf  
56 Jon Hale (2020), “Sustainable Funds - U.S. Landscape Report,” Morningstar, February 14th.    
57 Eurosif (2018), European SRI Study 2018.  
58 Business Roundtable is “an association of CEOs of America’s leading companies working to promote a thriving 
U.S. economy and expanded opportunity for all Americans through sound public policy.”  
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generating value added for each one in order to ensure the future success of the businesses, 
communities, and the whole country. 
ESG investment covers a whole spectrum of aspects that place the analysis of environmental, 
social, and governance criteria at the heart of the investment evaluation and portfolio selection 
process. The use of ESG criteria contributes to more in-depth financial analysis at a time when 
the company’s performance is under closer scrutiny by a range of stakeholders. The ESG 
approach can encourage companies to reduce negative externalities and attract and retain a 
competitive workforce, thereby enhancing their intangible value and strengthening confidence 
in the overall financial system. ESG investment could also encourage direct investment in areas 
such as renewable energy and green technologies as the world moves toward a lower carbon 
economy. 
Investment managers who emphasize ESG criteria in their investment processes do so in a 
variety of ways. Some use ESG criteria to perform a preliminary screening, and then apply more 
traditional investment analysis to the retained sectorsor companies. Others incorporate ESG 
criteria into the set of factors considered throughout the process. Some focus on ESG sub-
themes, particularly in areas such as climate change and diversity. Most fund managers applying 
ESG strategies actively engage with the companies and support or even sponsor resolutions at 
shareholder meetings. 
Delineating the universe of sustainable funds is complicated, since a number of fund managers 
have articulated strategies reflecting their own vision of ESG investing. There are strategies that 
include various ESG criteria among other investment choices; and there are strategies in which 
ESG analysis and impacts are central and intentional features. Both of these strategies have 
become much more prevalent in recent years.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to companies voluntarily taking into consideration 
the social and ethical ramifications of their activities. Business activities are here understood in 
the broadest sense: economic activities, internal and external interactions. 
Confronted by this significant shift on the part of large investment funds, two paradoxes stand 
out as meriting attention. First of all, why don’t companies, which naturally want to maximize 
their value, spontaneously adopt an ESG policy? This would, in fact, amount to optimizing the 
long-term value of the company thanks to the social capital generated by the respect of its 
workforce, suppliers, and customers? Why this myopic vision focused on quarterly profits? Why 
these failures in terms of human rights (child labour)? Why this neglect of the environment 
(pollution)? Are these phenomena due to the absence of relevant markets, the inefficiency of 
markets for dealing with risk and uncertainty in the short term vs. the long term, a high level of 
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risk aversion among managers (which would lead them to neglect the long term and even the 
medium term), inadequate training, or a lack of vision?59  
Second, why don’t buyers / consumers spontaneously value the goods and services produced by 
ESG-recognized or -certified companies? Does the jacket I am wearing today respect ESG 
principles? In other words, was it made by a company that strove to and succeeded in 
complying with these principles? Honestly, I hope so, but I have no idea. What would convince 
me?  
Let us examine four propositions or trains of thought relevant to the ESG paradigm or shift.  
 The first follows from key factors of quality improvement, so from the key ESG 
factors themselves;  
 A second focuses on the respective roles of business and government in the 
development of ESG;  
 A third is the coordination of human rights, and more specifically child labour, with 
the framework of an ESG policy;  
 Finally, a fourth qualifies the company’s level of ESG-compatible liability for 
industrial and environmental accidents and disasters to which it may have 
contributed.  
In each of these cases, the results of the economic analysis may be surprising.  
What are the “Fab 4” factors of quality growth and, by extension, the “Fab 4” of an ESG policy 
and, more generally, economy? There is a strong consensus among economists that the main 
factors explaining the differences in performance between countries and regions in terms of 
economic growth, collective wellbeing, and standard of living are the following: the quantity and 
quality of human capital, the capacity for invention and innovation, the quality and strength of 
incentive mechanisms, and the quality of mechanisms for allocating resources and coordinating 
private and public decisions. The last two factors define the general concept of well governed 
organizations and institutions. These four growth factors are highly complementary: an increase 
in one factor raises the incremental value of the others. This allows us to group societies into 
                                                                
59 Martin Boyer and Ksenia Kordonsky (2019), “Corporate Social Responsibility and Litigation Risk” (mimeo), show 
that companies’ ESG policies and activities reduce the likelihood of facing securities class actions and that a higher 
ESG score reduces the magnitude of the market’s abnormal reaction to news of suspected fraud. In both cases, ESG 
policies and actions contribute to the value of the firm. These results contradict the premise of Jean Tirole (2001), 
“Corporate Governance” (Econometrica, 69, 1–35) and Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2010), “Individual and 
corporate social responsibility” (Economica 77, 1–19), who maintain that ESG activities are only the symptom of 
agency problems in the company and that they are carried out at the expense of shareholders.  
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two large sets: those in which all these factors are well-developed and pervasive and those in 
which they are all lacking in quantity and quality. 
The relative performance of societies differs less because of variations in their endowments in 
human and material resources and creative capacities than because of variations in the 
incentive structures and mechanisms for resource allocation and coordination of decisions 
under which their members, individual and organizational, operate. 
The first factor: human capital. A society, country, or region’s levels of competitiveness and 
productivity—as well as of innovation and commercialization of innovations—and thus of 
quality of life improvements, depend on three main characteristics: first, on the capacity of its 
education sector in the broad sense of meeting industrial and social needs for skills of different 
types and levels both in quality and quantity; second, on the size and effectiveness of its 
investments in R&D and its capacity to transform new ideas into new processes, products, and 
services; and third, on the flexibility with which it can adapt to changes in its social, economic, 
and business environment and the willingness and determination it shows to meet the 
challenges posed by exogenous and endogenous changes. 
The second factor: inventions and innovations. The ability and willingness to identify, adopt, 
adapt, implement, and commercialize inventions and innovations, whether technological, social, 
or organizational, is an indispensable precondition for economic growth. Inventions are 
numerous, innovations less so. This capacity and willingness is rooted in individual attitudes to 
change as well as in the ability of social, organizational, and political institutions to foster the 
necessary flexibility, reliability, and flexicurity.   
The third factor: incentives (information, congruence, compatibility). Sufficiently strong 
incentive mechanisms require that individuals’ compensation (understood in the broadest 
sense) and companies’ profits be based on their yields or performance in fulfilling their 
missions. To the extent that too many compensation mechanisms in our societies, at the 
individual, group, company, or organizational level, are weak or misalignment with private and 
social goals, the proliferation of free-riding and a growth-killing destruction of potential wealth 
are implicitly fostered at considerable social cost.  
The fourth factor: efficient allocation and coordination mechanisms. Competencies and human 
capital and technological and organizational innovation are key determinants of growth and 
wellbeing. However, the rules of good governance that include incentive and resource 
allocation and coordination mechanisms, in both the private and public arenas, are even more 
important because they condition the first two.   
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Efficient resource allocation requires that good signals be sent to individuals and businesses 
about the relative scarcity of goods and services. Usually, the most effective mechanisms are 
those consistent with competitive markets, including auctions: among others those designed to 
curb the NIMBY (not in my backyard) syndrome. To the extent that too many prices are 
administered, manipulated, and controlled or fixed at levels that deviate from their competitive 
values, the ability of the economy to efficiently generate value and wealth for citizens is 
significantly undermined.  
These administered prices cause distortions and losses due to over- or underproduction of 
goods and services. In general, these price manipulations are intended to support some 
consumer or producer groups or to give consumers an incentive to consume more of certain 
goods and services. Regardless of the rationale or goal of these price controls, there is always a 
better way to achieve the desired objective without unduly distorting the allocation of 
resources.  
Consequently, the emergence of competitive prices and markets, including the creation of 
markets and improvements to their functioning, should be promoted in all sectors of the 
economy, including the public and social goods and services sectors. 
In the case of energy prices, for example, the artificial suppression of prices always leads to 
misguided resource extraction policies that ultimately benefit only the groups specifically 
targeted while the benefits that could be generated by a socially optimal resource exploitation 
are forgone.  
These policies necessarily and inevitably lead to collective impoverishment. The policy of 
suppressing prices always results in higher levels of taxation and indebtedness, which in turn 
lead to a deterioration of social services and infrastructure, thus undermining future economic 
development.  
This is not only an inefficient subsidy to energy-intensive consumers, including both individuals 
and companies, but also a regressive transfer from low income households to those that are 
better off.  
The case of agricultural prices is similar. The channels through which political assistance is 
provided differ from one region or country to the next: direct financial aid, supply management 
or production quotas, price floors, import restrictions (tariffs and quotas), etc. If farmers and 
ranchers need to be subsidized, it is best to do so through direct transfers, which should be 
offered through competitive incentive mechanisms without opaque price manipulations. In this 




Similar analyses could be applied to education and healthcare, sectors in which price 
manipulation to the benefit of interest groups creates socially costly distortions in the allocation 
of resources and undermines collective wellbeing.  
It is not low prices that generate growth and welfare, it is the right prices.Hence a first 
proposition on enhanced ESG: 
Proposition 1: One objective of ESG should be procurement and investment policies that 
oppose price manipulations: for example, one criterion should be avoiding direct or indirect 
investments in companies and sectors that demand, promote, or benefit from price 
manipulations, including large and ongoing direct or indirect subsidies, and avoiding 
consumption of their products and services.  
It would be interesting to develop an ESG price manipulation index by industry, sector, region or 
even country. Price manipulations, whether from the private sector (cartels) or the public 
sector, should be sanctioned by the SRI / SRE / CSR movement.  
The true economic ethic is first and foremost an ethic of efficiency and effectiveness based on 
competitive prices.  
ESG is a central issue of the government or public sector 
By way of introduction to my second proposal, which is directly related to the first, let us 
consider Bill Moyer’s above-mentioned speech to the Environmental Grantmakers Association 
in October 2001: “... I would like to make the following statement ... If you want to fight for the 
environment, don’t hug a tree; hug an economist instead. Hug the economist who tells you that 
fossil fuels are the third most heavily subsidized economic sector after road transportation and 
agriculture. Hug an economist who tells you that the price system is potentially the most 
powerful tool for generating social change.” 
To the extent that ESG is concerned about the environment, it is significantly constrained by the 
absence of markets. Creating and developing markets—which are naturally (to wit, 
economically) nonexistent—with all the associated institutions and regulations to ensure their 
emergence and efficiency, is a vital and central job of the public or governmental sector.  
Implementation of the right level of environmental protection can be achieved through 
competitive pricing of environmental services. If firms and individuals have to pay to use 
environmental services, such as air and water quality, they will rationally equate the marginal 
value, specifically the value of the marginal product, to the price.  
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Sound use of the environment, whether called degradation, destruction, or protection—which 
are basically different facets of the same prism—is socially efficient if it results from trades in a 
well-designed market system. Similarly, it is socially responsible for the firm to maximize its 
value (rather than its profit, which is a short-term or periodic measure).  
When Milton Friedman wrote:60  “The social responsibility of business is to increase profits,” he 
understood that the correspondence between ESG (or its equivalent at that time) and profit 
maximization is based on the existence of competitive markets and prices that reflect the 
marginal values of products and services to buyers / consumers and of factor prices that are 
linked to marginal opportunity costs (competitive prices) of the human, material, and financial 
resources used.  
The modern capitalist firm is a formidable wealth creator, transforming assorted human, 
natural, material, and technological resources into products and services of greater value. 
However, this transformation must be based on reliable and appropriate indicators of relative 
values, first and foremost competitive input and output prices, generally set by competitive 
markets but sometimes by administrative mechanisms emulating competitive markets.        
Proposition 2: ESG is primarily a government or public sector issue. It is in response to a failure 
of the government sector to create the conditions for the emergence of competitive markets 
and processes as well as competitive prices that ESG has become a business or private sector 
issue. What should have been and should be a case of “business as usual” has become an issue 
that generates divisions, diversions and misappropriation of mission for companies and citizens. 
Human rights and child labor  
My third proposition concerns human rights, another core issue for ESG. I am thinking in 
particular of child labour in poorer economies.  
On the basis of 105 national household surveys, in collaboration with several national and 
international statistical agencies, the International Labour Organization estimates61 that in 2016 
some 152 million children aged 5 to 17 (58 per cent boys) were victims of child labour, nearly 50 
per cent of them in Africa and 40 per cent in the Asia-Pacific region. Of these 152 million 
children, almost 50 per cent were aged 5–11, 28 per cent 12–14, and 24 per cent 15–17. Some 
73 million of these children were engaged in hazardous work (62 per cent boys and 25 per cent 
under the age of 12). Child labour was found mainly in agriculture (71 per cent) but also in 
services (17 per cent) and industry (12 per cent), including mining. Nearly 69 per cent of child 
                                                                
60 The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. 
61 ILO, Global Estimates of Child Labour: Results and trends, 2012-2016 , Geneva, September, 2017. 
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labour occurs in family-owned farms and businesses, while contract work and self-employment 
accounts for 27 and 4 per cent of these jobs, respectively.  
The ILO report notes that 32 per cent of the child labourers do not attend school and that 68 
per cent of children attend part-time but are educationally penalized because their work 
interferes with their ability to fully benefit from their presence in the classroom. Their dropout 
rate is high and their academic performance below expectations. 
How can we define an ESG policy on child labour? In its 1998 Special Report on Human Rights 
and “The Power of Publicity,” The Economist62 wrote: “In many circumstances too much 
pressure can be counterproductive, especially when it comes to labour standards. If western 
firms are persuaded by a torrent of criticism to reduce their investment or withdraw from low-
wage countries, then local workers are the ones who suffer.” 
Sam Vaknin (2002)63 reminds us that the issue of child labour “ … is all heartrending and it gave 
rise to a veritable not-so-cottage industry of activists, commentators, legal eagles, scholars, and 
opportunistically sympathetic politicians. Ask the denizens of Thailand, sub-Saharan Africa, 
Brazil, or Morocco and they will tell you how they regard this altruistic hyperactivity—with 
suspicion and resentment.”  
It is difficult to put the lie to them when they say, and sincerely believe, that behind the 
arguments, which are certainly convincing in the abstract, lies a program of trade protectionism. 
The inclusion in international treaties of articles that impose strict or even impossible working 
conditions and environmental protection indiscriminately and across-the-board is, or could be, a 
form of protectionism—a trade policy designed to eliminate imports of products that intensify 
the competition some well-established domestic industries and their political allies face from 
countries that appropriately rely on cheap labour. These interventions are not only anti-ESG but 
also ignore the benefits from international trade accruing to both partners.  
Vaknin asserts that there are important nuances to be considered in the matter of child labour. There is a 
consensus that children should not be exposed to dangerous conditions and long working hours, be used as a 
means of payment, be physically punished, or be used as sex slaves. But in many poor communities, the work 
performed by children is a way to prevent the breakdown of the family unit. Depriving children of the opportunity 
to work and, in so doing, help raise their families out of malnutrition, disease, and famine is a height 
of immoral hypocrisy.  
                                                                
62 The Economist (December, 1998). https://www.economist.com/special-report/1998/12/03/the-power-of-
publicity. 




It should be remembered that child labour was common in the United States in the 19th 
century, and even until the middle of the 20th century.  
Miriam Wasserman (2000)64 writes: 
“At the beginning of the twentieth century, pressure for [US] federal 
legislation covering child labor was growing nationally, but especially in the 
North. It was greeted with resentment in many segments of southern 
society. They saw it as interference from a richer North which - after having 
benefited from child labor in its own industrial development - was trying to 
limit the South’s development… The plight of working children in the 
developing world today is not very different, and in some cases even less 
harsh, than that prevalent in countries such as the United States and 
England during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”65 
Additionally, Paul (2017)66 writes: 
“In the late 1700′s and early 1800′s, power-driven machines began to 
replace hand labor for the making of most manufactured items. Factories 
sprung everywhere, first in England and then in the United States. The 
owners of these factories found a new source of labor to run their machines 
— children. Factory owners preferred hiring children because they were 
cheaper, less likely to strike, and more manageable than adults. However, 
factory work was grueling; a child working in a factory worked 12 to 18 
hours a day, six days a week, for only one dollar. Many children began 
working as young as 7, tending machines in spinning mills or carrying heavy 
loads. By the mid-1800′s, child labor and its lasting effects on children’s 
health and education came under scrutiny of reformers. A United States 
                                                                
64 Miriam Wasserman (2000), “Eliminating Child Labor,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Regional Review 10(2). 
https://www.bostonfed.org/home/publications/regional-review/2000/quarter-2/eliminating-child-labor.aspx. 
65 For a collection of photographs of children’s workplaces, taken between 1908 and 1924 by Lewis Wickes Hine, on 
behalf of National Child Labor Committee (NCLC), see the Website of the US Library of Congress  
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/search/?sp=1&co=nclc t=grid; for example 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lewis_Hine,_Glass_works,_midnight,_Indiana,_1908.jpg: “The NCLC 
photos are useful for the study of labor, reform movements, children, working class families, education, public 
health, urban and rural housing conditions, industrial and agricultural sites, and other aspects of urban and rural 
life in America in the early twentieth century.” 
66 Paul, C. A. (2017). National Child Labor Committee (NCLC). Social Welfare History Project. 
http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/child-welfarechild-labor/national-child-labor-committee/. Also see 
US Bureau of the Census Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 




Census report from 1890 showed that over 1.5 million children between the 
ages of ten and fifteen were employed. This number comprised almost 20 
percent of all children in that age range. Just ten years later, the 1900 
Census showed that over 1.75 million children between the ages of ten and 
fifteen were working in gainful occupations.” 
According to Vaknin, the outcry against the use of children to sew soccer balls in Pakistan has 
led to the relocation of Nike and Reebok’s workshops. Thousands of people lost their jobs, 
including many women and some 7000 of their children. Average family income, already barely 
enough to survive on, fell by 20 per cent. There are many other examples. According to 
Wasserman, German garment manufacturers laid off 50 000 children in Bangladesh in 1993 in 
anticipation of the passage of a US law against child labour (the Child Labor Deterrence Act, 
which never saw the light of day).  
Ending child labour without doing anything else could be very damaging to both the families and 
the children themselves. Preventing them from working could force them to take on even more 
dangerous work (including prostitution). Of course, we all agree that, ideally, these children 
would be in school, receiving an education that will lift them out of poverty. To be relevant and 
socially responsible, this alternative must actually exist. 
Proposition 3: ESG should set realistic and attainable criteria for the socially responsible nature 
of child labour. ESG should develop and provide a suitable framework to regulate the work of 
children. Abolishing and prohibiting child labour without attending to the consequences of such 
a ban (to wit the existence of real and credible alternatives) is not socially responsible: It is 
primarily the responsibility of the government sector to allow and encourage an increase in the 
opportunity cost of child labour. 
The responsibility of firms in five parts  
My proposition on corporate responsibility is divided in five parts. It is a complex subject, and 
the results of economic analysis can sometimes surprise. Then, to begin with the argument: if 
we are to enable and encourage a socially responsible level of investment, corporations cannot 
be held fully and completely liable for major environmental and / or industrial accidents. 
Properly assigning the (extended) liability shared between companies, partners (bankers and 
insurers), and governments / society requires a realistic framework. This realtistic framework 
must recognize the limits of such responsibility, the limited capacity for government 
intervention, the limited ability of the courts to avoid Type I errors (convicting an innocent firm) 
and Type II errors (clearing a guilty firm). It must also recognize the existence of incomplete or 
asymmetric information (moral hazard, adverse selection, monitoring difficulties) within and 
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between the main partners (governments, companies, their partners—including financial 
partners, and the courts). All these factors enter together in the determination of the 
probability of environmental and industrial accidents.  
In this context, the government acting as a benevolent planner must legislate shared liability 
(both strict liability and liability for negligence, as well as extended liability) and prevention 
standards. The following developments are based on U.S. case law (CERCLA) and European 
regulations governing financial guarantees and compulsory insurance.67  
Five key factors determine the level of socially responsible corporate liability: profitability; the 
cost of measures to prevent accidents; their effectiveness; the social cost of public funds; and 
the ability of the courts to avoid Type I and Type II errors. Interactions between these factors in 
the characterization of a socially responsible allocation of resources are complex and not always 
intuitive. To find our bearings and define appropriate policies that promote social wellbeing we 
need to go beyond a superficial analysis. Thus, the fourth proposal is in five parts.68 
Proposition 4.1: A decrease in corporate profitability should reduce the company’s socially 
responsbile (ESG) liability and raise safety or prevention standards. This will increase monitoring 
efforts while reducing prevention efforts and increasing the likelihood of industrial or 
environmental accidents. 
This result is due to the fact that a decline in the company’s profitability implies more frequent 
recourse to government funds to cover the cost of an accident. Thus, in order to mitigate the 
impact of the social cost of government funds on general wellbeing, the financial partner 
(banker or insurer) assumes more liability thanks to a higher level of mandatory insurance (or 
bank liability). Although the monitoring effort increases, the company tends to reduce its 
prevention activities. The higher prevention standards combined with the decrease in 
prevention activities means that the company is more likely to be found guilty of negligence if 
prosecuted. 
                                                                
67 On this subject, see Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1997), “Environmental Risks and Bank Liability,” 
European Economic Review 41, 1427–1459; Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini (2004), “Modeling the Choice 
between Liability and Regulation in terms of Social Welfare,” Canadian Journal of Economics 37(3), 590–612; 
Marcel Boyer et Donatella Porrini (2008), “The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor for Environmental Disasters: Lessons 
for Optimal Insurance Regulation”, The Geneva Papers 33, 337-362. 
68 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini (2011), “The Impact of Court Errors on Liability Sharing and Safety regulation 
for Environmental/Industrial Accidents,” International Review of Law and Economics 31, 21–29. 
55 
 
Proposition 4.2: A higher cost of prevention activities should reduce the company’s socially 
responsible (ESG) liability, leading to a lower level of prevention and thus a higher probability of 
accidents. 
A higher cost of accident prevention activities alters the first-order values: Reduced prevention 
efforts and thus an increased probability of accidents result in less liability for the company, 
greater monitoring efforts and a higher probability of being found guilty of negligence 
Proposition 4.3: When prevention efforts are or become more effective in reducing the 
likelihood of accidents, the benevolent government will want to save on the costs of these more 
effective prevention activities while achieving a lower likelihood of accidents. To do so, it will 
want to leave unchanged the company’s ESG share of liability while reducing standards of 
prevention. 
An increased effectiveness of prevention efforts in reducing the probability of accidents also 
affects the first-order values (a reduced level of prevention combined with reduced probability 
of accidents), resulting in an increase then a decrease (above a certain level of care) in the 
company’s liability, lower standards of prevention, a decrease in monitoring activities, a 
decrease in the level of prevention and a lower probability of accidents and of being convicted 
for negligence (which explains the decrease in the value of monitoring). Although the chosen 
level of prevention and the probability of an accident move in the same direction as their first-
order values, the probability of conviction for negligence decreases because the reduction in 
chosen prevention efforts is less pronounced than the decrease in the prevention standards.  
Proposition 4.4: An increase in the social cost of public funds (due too a reduced efficiency of 
government financing or a more important transfert of risks to taxpayers) will lead the 
benevolent government to reduce corporate ESG liability but increase prevention standards. 
This will lead to an increase in monitoring efforts, a reduction in the level of prevention chosen, 
and thus an increase in the probability of accidents, and an increase in the probability of 
conviction.  
These impacts are mainly due to the need for the government to reduce its own spending given 
their increased social costs. To accomplish this it lowers the company’s share of liability, which 
increases the level of compulsory insurance (or bank liability). To avoid excessive cutbacks in 
prevention efforts, the government will also increase prevention standards.  
Proposition 4.5: An increase in the efficiency of the judicial system (reduction of Type I and II 
errors) will lead the benevolent government to reduce corporate ESG liability and lower 
standards of prevention; giving rise to a decrease in monitoring efforts, an increase in the level 
of prevention chosen by the company (from below standard to above standard, because the 
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efficiency of the courts incentivizes good corporate behaviour) and a corresponding reduction in 
the likelihood of accidents and of conviction. 
These impacts of a more efficient justice system are essentially due to complex interactions 
between the different factors that shape the incentives for companies to increase their 
prevention activities and their socially optimal responses to the government’s choices (liability 
and standards). Faced with a more efficient judicial system, which contributes to incentivizing 
companies to increase prevention, the government chooses to implement reduced corporate 
liability and to lower prevention standards, anticipating that companies and financiers will also 
exploit these developments to reduce the monitoring effort and increase the level of 
prevention, ultimately resulting in a reduced probability of accidents. Thus, a more efficient 
judicial system ensures that stakeholders / partners face better incentives—allowing them to 
cut back on monitoring efforts—and reduces costly public disbursements due to diminished 
corporate liability, a lower probability of accidents, and a smaller likelihood of conviction for 
negligence if a case goes to court. 
3. Analyzing and reforming capitalism  
Among all the reform projects of capitalism, eight are of particular interest for our purpose here 
given the nature of their content and their direct links with economics:69 Luigi Zingales (2012), 
Paul Mason (2015), Jean Tirole (2016), The Economist (2018), Joseph Stiglitz (2019), Philippe 
Aghion (2020), Thomas Piketty (2019), World Business Councilfor  Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD 2010, 2019). The first six are advocates for the effectiveness and efficiency of 
competitive markets and their ability to generate growth and well-being. They also recognize 
the flaws in the price and market system when dominated by large companies in a situation of 
market power and political power. They note in particular the role of the markets in the 
generation of significant inequalities of income and wealth and recognize, in order to plug these 
loopholes, the preponderant roles of truthful prices, well-designed regulation, and open 
                                                                
69 Other criticisms, analyses, and movements to reform capitalism take more from the “democratic socialism” 
model, contemporary business management, and the impacts of technological change, in particular automation 
and information technologies. Let me mention the unavoidable work of Peter Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society 
(Harper Information, 1993) who maintains that we have passed into a postcapitalist production system, where 
capital has lost its centrality because it is less entrepreneurial and more the property of financial companies, such 
as insurance companies, investments funds, banks, etc. As the owners of capital, citizens have thus become virtual 
owners of large enterprises. This does not destroy, but does alter, the nature of capitalism. Drucker predicts that 
postcapitalist society will become a society of organizations in which social classes will be divided into knowledge 
and service classes. He expected the transformation to postcapitalism to be completed by 2010–2020. He also 
argues in favour of a reform of intellectual property by the creation of a universal licensing system. Consumers 
would subscribe at a given cost, and producers could use, reproduce, and distribute protected works freely.  
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competition, just as demanding as benevolent and benefactor. The seventh reform project is 
more a reform of participatory socialism.  
As for the last project (WBCSD), it emphasizes the notion of "true value" that companies would 
not be directly inclined to generate, focusing instead on "financial value". The WBCSD claims 
that “capitalism itself needs to be reoriented to serve a new purpose: not simply the pursuit of 
financial profits and economic efficiency, but the pursuit of true value, preserving and 
enhancing natural, social and financial capital.” 
But before proceeding with very brief descriptions of these eight retained reform proposals, we 
need to define capitalism and give a succinct overview of its currently most popular 
manifestations. Branko Milanovic (2019) 70 will serve as our guide. In his opinion, capitalism not 
only became the dominant economic paradigm, especially after the spectacular collapse of 
communism in 1989, but it is, in fact, the only one still remaining on the international scene.  
The capitalist nature of this (only) system is manifest in the fact that the production of goods 
and services is primarily motivated by profit, bringing together labour from workers who are 
legally free, hired, and compensated, and privately owned capital, while the whole is 
coordinated by a decentralized system of prices. This capitalism comes in two flavours: liberal 
meritocratic capitalism, principally exemplified by the United States and the European Union, 
and political capitalism, of which the best example is China. 
Under liberal meritocratic capitalism, investments are essentially decided by private firms and 
independent entrepreneurs in a setting of equal opportunity based on merit (or talent), 
entrepreneurial freedom, and social and economic mobility that is determined by performance 
in wealth creation. According to Milanovic, this brand of capitalism leads over time to a high 
level of income and wealth inequality and the emergence of a rich upper class, the propagation 
of which is less and less ensured by merit-based equality of opportunity. Through a process of 
entrenchment, this rich upper class has managed to form an elite and resist contestation by 
new talents and skills and by new entrepreneurs seeking upward mobility. The biggest challenge 
in liberal meritocratic capitalism is to find a way to prevent this oligarchy from using various 
tools at its disposal to become entrenched, leading to a decline in equality of merit-based 
opportunity. 
Political capitalism, which is best exemplified by China, is also capitalism in that its primary 
motivation is profit and in being organized around firms that bring together free labour and 
private capital and choose their output and prices in a decentralized fashion. According to 
Milanovic, government control of production, which was nearly 100 per cent prior to 1978 and 
                                                                
70 Branko Milanovic, Capitalism, Alone, Harvard University Press 2019. 
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still over 50 per cent in 1998, only represents approximately 20 per cent today. The share of 
private investment has attained 65 per cent, and private urban employment is 85 per cent. The 
main feature of this political capitalism is the existence of a powerful bureaucracy whose role is 
to implement policies designed to promote the pursuit and attainment of robust economic 
growth. Its second key characteristic is the absence of rule of law and checks and balances on 
the interventionist government. Arbitrating conflicts between these two characteristics and 
resisting systemic, endemic, and inequality-generating corruption, which is inevitable in the 
absence of rule of law, are the two main challenges to political capitalism. 
We would add here that the role played by competition in promoting efficiency and 
effectiveness in production and investment under the responsibility of the private sector has no 
counterpart in the sense of competition between tiers of government or multiple decentralized 
checks and balances within the governmental apparatus.       
3.1 Reforming Capitalism (Zingales, Mason, Tirole, The Economist, Stiglitz, Aghion, Piketty) 
Luigi Zingales’ (2012) reform of capitalism71 
Luigi Zingales sets himself the goal of, not only sounding the alarm regarding the cancer of 
collusive and crony capitalism, but also of defining a program for eradicating this cancer before 
it metastasizes. This program is spearheaded by a reaffirmation of the power of competition. 
Zingales claims that the absence of competition and major distortions caused by all sorts of 
government subsidies underlie all of today’s economic ills (he published his book in 2012), 
including declining real incomes of the middle class. His goal is thus to harness the power of 
competition and to define the conditions conducive to it playing a positive role, in particular the 
affirmation of a simplified and transparent regulation of property rights and the right to 
compete, and the information sharing required for balanced transactions between economic 
agents.  
To Zingales, competition curbs a firm’s ability to earn supra-competitive profits, makes the 
benefits of innovation available to consumers, and promotes efficiency and effectiveness and 
thus meritocracy. Under this system, responsibilities fall on the shoulders of those most able to 
bear them and equitable compensation is ensured. Consequently, economists should be more 
concerned with studying the actual health of competition than with deriving results about the 
benefits of competition on the premise that it actually exists. For these benefits to be a reality, 
markets have to be open and transparent and conditions for free entry in place. Robust 
                                                                




competition is the best bulwark against monopolization and the entrenchment of crony 
capitalism.  
Zingales also warns against PPPs in which the government and business are partners. It is 
necessary to be vigilant regarding the promises of these PPPs, so that the vision of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the private sector merging with the social goals of the public sector is not, 
somehow, disastrously reversed, with the social objectives of the private sector being joined 
with the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. The example of Fannie Mae in the 
United States is a most eloquent illustration of a PPP gone bad. According to Zingales, the 
greatest advantage of Fannie Mae as a PPP was that it benefited from government backing of its 
loans. It is estimated72 that this benefit represented some $6.1 billion in 2000 and $13.6 billion 
in 2003. Only two-thirds of this was recuperated by the government lender, with some $6.6 
billion being misappropriated by private shareholders and managers at the expense of 
taxpayers.73      
The program espoused by Zingales is designed to strengthen competition and the economy of 
competitive markets by means of a more aggressive stance against the uncompetitive 
development and propagation of market power and crony capitalism74 and a more vigorous 
defence of freedom, democracy, and social mobility. 
The battle against income and wealth inequality, which is attributable to inequality of 
opportunity (education) and barriers to entry, in short unjustified limitations on economic 
contestation, is grounded in the intensification of competition at all levels, yielding better 
measures of performance,developing an incentive social safety net focussed on the benefits of 
                                                                
72 Congressional Budget Office, “Updated estimates of the Subsidies to the Housing GSEs,” April 2004.  
73 Marcel Boyer writes in “Growing out of the Crisis and Recessions : Regulating Systemic Financial Institutions and 
Redefining Government Responsibilities” (CIRANO 2015s-01 (http ://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2015s-
01.pdf): “Despite a 2002 study released by Fannie Mae which argued that it was very unlikely that the two 
government-sponsored enterprises would ever require a government bailout (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jonathan M. 
Orszag, Peter R. Orszag, “Implications of the New Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Risk-based Capital Standard,” 
Fannie Mae Papers, Vol. 1, Issue 2, March 2002), one can read in the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) 
report of January 2011 : “Unfortunately, the balancing act ultimately failed and both companies were placed into 
conservatorship, costing the U.S. taxpayers $151 billion so far.” 
74 The worst collusive, or crony, capitalists are those who can drape their requests for protection and subsidies in 
the flag of a noble cause, such as the pursuit of a common good or the defence of the national interest. Thus, 
Zingales identifies academics (professors and administrators of schools, colleges, and universities) as among the 




insurance75 and conducive to productivity gains, and driving a reinvention of competition policy 
that makes it more focused on protecting competition.  
It is not always straightforward to distinguish between good and bad interventions or 
approaches that are designed to protect competition. It is here that economic ethics, social 
capital, social norms, limits to lobbying, efficient taxation, responsible finance, and the creation 
of markets to internalize externalities come into play, all of which are addressed directly or 
indirectly by Zingales.  
This list could include the creation of markets and institutions to counteract the tragedy of 
common property or common use (too many private exploitation permits leading to resource 
depletion) and the “tragedy of the anticommons,” undue curbs on socially profitable 
exploitation (too many veto rights leading to a systematic blockage of all exploitation). 
In conclusion, Zingales reiterates that a pro-market policy is not a pro-business policy, and that 
the true genius of capitalism is not in private property or the pursuit of profit, but rather in 
competition. In the final analysis, the reason for the phenomenal success of the market 
economy lies in competition, properly framed and promoted by appropriate rules of social and 
financial responsibility, accountability, freedom, democracy, and ethical and responsible 
governance.       
Paul Mason’s (2015) reform of capitalism76  
Paul Mason asserts that a postcapitalism77 will emerge from new automation and information 
technologies (IT) characterized by a proliferation of informational goods that are reproducible at 
zero cost (and thus free), a reduced requirement for labour or human capital, and a rise of 
collaborative production. Mason sees increasing income inequality, the recurrence of very long 
economic cycles (as Kondratiev cycles), and climate change as relatively direct consequences of 
capitalism. Many economists, policy analysts, and philosophers have started seriously reflecting 
on the emergence and functioning of a postcapitalist society. 
For Mason, the evolution and increasing sophistication of automation and information 
technologies threaten jobs and shine a spotlight on the internal contradictions of capitalism—
                                                                
75 We might consider Claude Montmarquette’s PIR to fall under this grouping “Proportional Income Reimbursement 
(PIR): A system for student loans that combines efficiency and accessibility,” CIRANO 2006RP-08, 2006. https 
://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2006RP-08.pdf 
76 Paul Mason, PostCapitalism : A Guide to Our Future, London: Allen Lane, 2015. 
77 A generic term to describe the future of today’s capitalism based on private property, competitive markets, 
entrepreneurial freedom, government regulation—a future that will spring from developments in information 
technologies (IT), encroaching government powers, the apocalyptic consequences of climate change, etc. This is 
sometimes called info-capitalism, network capitalism, the new capitalism, social capitalism, etc.  
61 
 
which will ultimately lead to its collapse. Just like horses were progressively rendered obsolete 
by the invention of the automobile, human labour has been affected throughout history and will 
continue to be in the future. A modern example of technological unemployment is the 
replacement of cashiers by self-checkout lanes in retail stores. Today, technological 
developments are threatening jobs on an unprecedented scale.  
Mason continues by asserting that, if this leads to a world in which human labour is no longer 
required, our current models of the market system, which rely on scarcity, will need to adapt or 
vanish in the postcapitalist world.  
Postcapitalism is the upshot of major changes brought about by information technologies in 
recent years. Mason asserts that these technologies have blurred the boundaries between work 
and leisure and driven a wedge between work and wages. Information undermines the market’s 
ability to correctly form prices (truth in pricing), since information is abundant and information 
goods can be reproduced at zero cost. There is a cost to producing goods like music, software, 
and databases, but once they are created they can be copy-pasted endlessly.  
If the normal price setting mechanisms of capitalism prevail, then the price of any good that has 
no inherent reproduction cost will fall to zero. This loss of scarcity creates a problem for our 
economic models, which we strive to circumvent by creating vast technological monopolies that 
allow scarcity and the commercial value of information goods to be maintained. 
The problem with Paul Mason’s somewhat poetic reasoning is that informational goods and 
assets—the very ones that IT allows us to produce at a high fixed costs and reproduce at a zero 
marginal cost—can only be produced, distributed, and consumed by using limited resources 
and, therefore, at a non-nil marginal cost: labour, machinery, natural resources, and skills in the 
production and use of IT and information goods, assets and processes. These resources remain 
scarce, and are perhaps increasingly so. IT has created enormous potential. However, as 
expected, it has simultaneously exposed and exacerbated unsuspected scarcities. An economy 
that is completely free and totally immaterial is more an expression of utopianism than 
economic analysis. In this sense, IT creates particular, and significant, economic issues, but the 
era of postcapitalism that it could supposedly usher in is still compatible with the “complex and 
evolving” organism that is capitalism, properly understood.    
Jean Tirole’s (2016) reform of capitalism 
Jean Tirole78  broaches the reform of capitalism from the angle of relationships between an 
imperfect system of competitive markets and an imperfect government with inalienable 
                                                                
78 Jean Tirole, Économie du bien commun, Presses Universitaires de France 2016. 
62 
 
responsibilities. The choice isn’t between markets or government, but rather between more or 
less efficient markets, and a government that is more or less clear-sighted, including about its 
own limitations. Reforms are needed to both markets and government. 
Tirole recalls how the presentation by Jean-Jacques Laffont of his report Étapes vers un État 
moderne – Une analyse économique (1999) to the French Council of Economic Analysis 
unleashed a wave of indignation among the policy-makers, academics, and top bureaucrats in 
attendance: the report was dismissed as heresy. However, Laffont was only presenting an 
economic perspective in which the government reacts to incentives, can be captured by various 
interest groups, and may wish to pursue objectives other than the wellbeing of the population: 
Economics, truly the “dismal science.” 
On one hand, Tirole issues a reminder of the power of the efficiency and integrity harnessed by 
markets, undergirded by the freedom of entrepreneurship and commerce and by dynamic 
competition between companies. On the other hand, he speaks to the failures of markets 
insofar as, left to themselves, market exchanges may affect third parties without their consent, 
reflect temporary irrationality of the participants, lead to over-indebtedness of consumers who 
are poorly equipped to resist the lure of easy credit, succumb to the sway of non-competitive 
markets, and ultimately generate significant inequalities if only because of the absence of 
important useful “markets,” such as various insurance markets and social safety nets, among 
others.  
Similarly, the government, when left to its own without effective checks and balances, is in 
danger of being captured by lobbyists, sinking into collusive and crony capitalism, lying to ill-
informed voters (populism), and profiting from policies whose costs are dispersed and barely 
noticed and whose benefits are concentrated and very much noticed, and more or less legally 
cooking the books in public finances. This list is not exhaustive.  
The engine of growth and wellbeing, capitalism at the service of the common good, must 
receive ongoing tuneups, both sporadic and routine, to improve the functioning of markets and 
businesses, in the case of the latter this includes their social responsibilities, to improve the 
prevalence of truth in pricing,79 and to improve government interventions, which are sometimes 
necessary correctives and sometimes ill-advised meddling. 
                                                                
79 Jean Tirole ironically refers to the case of carbon pricing: The government, wanting to make economic agents take 
responsibility, should tell them; “If you emit one ton of CO2, it will cost you 50 or 100 € (of course, we are in a world 
of economics-fiction here!) It’s your call!”    
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The Economist’s (2018) reform of capitalism80 
In September and November of 2018 The Economist published two special reports on the future 
of capitalism. The first, “A manifesto for renewing liberalism / Reinventing liberalism for the 
21st century,” states that liberals have become a complaisant and inward-looking elite who 
need to rediscover their fire. The second “Competition – Trustbusting in the 21st century” 
contains a series of articles on the common theme of calling for a pro-competition liberation 
movement to bring to heel companies earning excessive profits and to ensure that innovation 
continues to flower. According to The Economist, since 1977 indices of concentration have 
increased in three out of four industries and dominant businesses are increasingly difficult to 
dethrone. Although globalization has allowed excess profits to be curbed, returns have 
increased greatly in protected industries while the quality of the goods and services they supply 
has deteriorated.  
The Economist proposes a three-prong plan of attack, asserting that the true spirit of liberalism 
is not self-perpetuation, but rather radicalism and disruption.    
First, intellectual property should serve to foster innovation and not to protect established 
firms. Two measures would be particularly effective: Require platforms to grant access to 
competitors under competitive terms, as was done in the case of networks (like telecoms, for 
example), and tighten controls on patents to make them harder to obtain, shorter in duration, 
and easier to contest in court. Maintaining vigorous competition should have precedence over 
protecting intellectual property.         
Next, antitrust authorities should aggressively dismantle barriers to entry and pursue pro-
competition policies with greater emphasis on stronger measures to encourage the arrival of 
new players on the market. To do this, governments must prohibit abusive non-compete clauses 
and nonessential professional certification requirements and simplify the complex regulations 
written by industry lobbyists.  
Finally, antitrust authorities must pay more attention to the overall level of competition in the 
economy and to excess profits in various industries. The Economist asserts that there is nothing 
wrong with enhancing consumer wellbeing by targeting monopolistic behaviour.      
 
                                                                
80 The Economist, “A manifesto for renewing liberalism / Reinventing liberalism for the 21st century,” September 
13, 2018; and “Competition - Trustbusting in the 21st century,” November 15, 2018. 
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Joseph Stiglitz’ (2019) reform of capitalism81 
Joseph Stiglitz starts from the premise that the United States has the highest level of inequality 
among advanced economies, and one of the lowest levels of social and economic opportunity 
and mobility. He asserts that there is an alternative, which he calls progressive capitalism. This 
progressive capitalism is not an oxymoron. It is based on the idea that the power of competitive 
markets can be harnessed to the service of society in general owing to their role as engines of 
growth and wellbeing. 
For Stiglitz, standards of living have been rising for over two centuries because of scientific 
innovation and the evolution of social organization, as reflected in institutions such as the rule 
of law and democracies endowed with checks and balances. The true source of a nation’s 
wealth is its citizens’ capacity for creativity and innovation.  
To increase their wealth, individuals can either add to the nation’s “economic pie” (wealth 
creation) or they can seize a bigger piece of the pie by either exploiting others or by abusing 
market power or insider information (cornering wealth or rent seeking). At the same time as the 
information economy (which deals with ubiquitous situations where information is imperfect 
and incomplete), 82 behavioural economics, and game theory were clearly demonstrating that 
markets left to themselves can be inefficient, unjust, unstable, and irrational, government policy 
in the United States was increasingly relying on unleashing its market system and reducing 
social protections. 
The result is a U.S. economy that is characterized by more exploitation and less wealth creation. 
The gutting of antitrust laws and lax application of what remained, combined with the inability 
of regulators to adapt to changes and innovations in the accumulation and abuse of market 
power, have had the effect of rendering markets more concentrated and less competitive. In 
order to play their role, markets must be structured around rules and regulations, and these 
rules and regulations must be vigorously enforced.  
Stiglitz proposes that the way out of this morass begins with recognizing the vital role played by 
the government in placing markets at the service of society, in ensuring that market regulation 
guarantees robust competition without abuses, and in aligning the interests of businesses with 
those of their workers, suppliers, and clients.  
                                                                
81  Joseph Stiglitz, People, Power, and Profits – Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent, W.W. Norton, 2019. 
82 Joseph Stiglitz was a key player in these developments. In 2001, he was awarded a Nobel Prize for his 
contributions to information economics.   
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At the level of government policy, Stiglitz identifies many other areas in which government 
intervention is required: protection against unemployment and disability, pensions with low 
administrative costs, protection against inflation, the development of adequate infrastructure, 
provision of high-quality universal education, and adequate support for fundamental research. 
According to Stiglitz, progressive capitalism amounts to a new social contract, with a basket of 
public policies centred on the production and distribution of public and social goods and 
services that are typically under the aegis of the government, and a policy of safeguarding, 
overseeing, and promoting competitive markets and effective pro-competition institutions.  
Nothing in Stiglitz’ project indicates whether the production and distribution of public and social 
goods and services are, or should be, subjected to competition. While several features of 
Stiglitz’ progressive capitalism and the competitive social democratic model are compatible, 
especially their shared emphasis on the development of a basket of public and social goods and 
services and an effective, even aggressive, competition policy, the two models have several 
important differences.   
Philippe Aghion’s (2020) reform of capitalism83 
Philippe Aghion and his co-authors see capitalism through the eyes of Schumpeter’s creative 
destruction process, more or less tempered by the implementation of a social safety net. For 
Aghion, we must accompany, but not prevent, the process of creative destruction, mainly 
through proper regulation.  
The power of creative destruction lies above all in its tremendous capacity to generate growth. 
The market economy, because it breeds creative destruction, is inherently disruptive. 
Historically, it has proven to be a formidable engine of prosperity, raising our societies to levels 
of development unimaginable two hundred years ago. The challenge is then to better 
understand the springs of this power in order to then orient it in the direction we collectively 
wish, that is, in search of a more sustainable and shared prosperity. 
In developed countries, capitalism has become more protective and more inclusive over time, 
thanks above all to the struggles led by civil society (unions, progressive parties, the media). The 
intervention of visionary minds to change the government apparatus in response to pressure 
from civil society has also been instrumental. 
Aghion strongly believes in the reasoned marriage of convenience or the potential fusion of a 
more cutthroat and aggressive capitalism (USA) and a more cuddly and inclusive capitalism 
                                                                
83  Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, Simon Bunel, Le pouvoir dela destruction créatrice – Innovation, croissance et 
avenir du capitalisme, Odile Jacob, 2020. 
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(Denmark, Sweden, Germany) for at least two reasons. First, the reforms towards more 
protection and inclusion in the United States have been done without hampering innovation, 
while the reforms facilitating innovation and creative destruction in Germany and Scandinavia 
have not led to a fundamental questioning of social protection systems and public services in 
these countries. Second, between innovation and inclusion - or between innovation and 
protection - what is being played is not a zero-sum game, quite the contrary.  
Facilitating the entry of new innovative companies and awakening the vocations of researchers 
stimulate innovation and growth while making both more inclusive. A well-designed incentive-
based flexisecurity in the labor market insures the individual against the negative consequences 
of a job loss, in particular on his health, while encouraging him/her to keep training to better 
prepare for a new job: the consequence is a better protection for individuals and a more 
intensive process of creative destruction. 
Thomas Piketty’s (2019) reform of capitalism / socialism 
Thomas Piketty84 caps the 17th and last chapter of his work under the title “Elements for a 
participatory socialism in the 21st century”. Thus, it is less a project of reform of capitalism than 
a project of reform of socialism. Either way, Piketty's reform project is heavily focused on 
mechanisms that would reduce "hyper-inequalities" in favor of "fair inequality." 
For Piketty, (translation) “the new hyper-unequal narrative that has prevailed since the 1980s 
and 1990s is not inevitable. If it is in part the product of history and of the communist disaster, it 
also stems from the insufficient dissemination of knowledge, overly rigid disciplinary barriers 
and limited citizen control of economic and financial issues, which are too often abandoned to 
others." An important element of his project is "to replace the notion of permanent private 
property by that of temporary property, through a strongly progressive tax on important 
properties making it possible to finance a universal capital endowment and thus organize a 
permanent circulation of goods and fortune ... A just society does not imply uniformity or 
absolute equality. To the extent that it results from different aspirations and distinct life 
choices, and where it improves living conditions and increases the scope of opportunities open 
to the most disadvantaged, then income and property inequalities can be fair.” 
For Piketty, proprietorship, defined as the absolute defense of private property, and capitalism, 
defined as the extension of proprietorship to industry, are based on the concentration of 
economic power which allows the owners of capital to decide sovereignly who to hire and for 
what salary.  
                                                                
84 Thomas Piketty, Capitalisme et Idéologie, Éditions du Seuil, 2019. 
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One must realize that this is obviously a particularly reductive view of capitalism, especially 
when it is subject to competition. In the characterization of capitalist, socialist or cooperative, 
labor, or ideist enterprises in subsection 1.3 above, the residual decision-making power will 
always rest with the group paid last, namely financial capital (capitalist enterprise), human 
capital (labor enterprise), or the intellectual capital (ideist company). And the compensation for 
the various resources used in the production of goods and services useful to buying customers 
will have to respect two constraints: first, the total compensation paid to all factors cannot 
systematically exceed the total revenue that citizens will agree to pay the company in exchange 
for the goods and services produced; then, the amount paid to each factor and the value of its 
best alternative use must occur or be calculated on a risk-adjusted basis. The mechanisms of 
value creation are well known and, unfortunately, it is not magic. 
For Piketty, (translation) "the progressive property tax appears to be an indispensable tool to 
ensure greater circulation and wider dissemination of property." Piketty recognizes the the 
progressive tax has never made it possible to distribute property to the poorest 50%, which can 
only limit their participation "in economic life, and in particular in the creation of companies and 
their governance." To get there, we have to go further. According to Piketty, “The most logical 
way to do this would be to put in place a system of capital endowment paid to every young 
adult (for example at the age of 25) and financed by a progressive tax on private property. By 
construction, such a system makes it possible to diffuse ownership at the base while limiting its 
concentration at the top.” 
Before raising a few questions about this project of reform of capitalism, let us recall the 
summary of the reform as expressed by Piketty himself: “The model of participatory socialism 
proposed here is based on two essential pillars aiming to go beyond the current system of 
private property, on the one hand through social ownership and the sharing of voting rights in 
companies, and on the other hand through temporary ownership and circulation of capital. By 
combining the two elements, we end up with a property system which has little to do with 
private capitalism as we know it today,and which constitutes a real overtaking of capitalism." 
Two comments come to mind when faced with this announced overtaking of capitalism: on the 
one hand, accounting is not economics and the way of cutting the cake does not increase its 
size, and on the other hand, the commonality of property will not escape the tragedy of the 
commons.85 If a common good or asset or common property is not adequately priced, economic 
agents, whether cooperatives, private or public firms, trade unions, consumers, governments, 
NGOs, or religious organizations, tend to overexploit it, thereby threatening its survival. 
                                                                
85 Recall: Garrett Hardin (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 162 (3859), 1243-1248. 
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Is it necessary to recall here the 1959-1961 food crisis in China86? Agricultural collectivization in 
China began around 1952 and was immediately a striking success: farm output skyrocketed 
between 1952 and 1958. Production cooperatives can be extremely profitable in contexts 
where information can be manipulated, provided that certain organizational characteristics 
allowing for the coordination and incentivization of effort are present. It appears that the 
organizational structure of the first Chinese agricultural cooperatives satisfied these 
requirements.  
However, in 1959 grain production fell by 15 per cent and then, in 1960 and 1961, it held at 
more than 30 per cent below 1958 levels. Why? Justin Yifu Lin (1990),87 who was an economist 
at the University of Beijing at that time, attributes most of the fall in production to a 
modification of the organization of the cooperatives that significantly reduced the scope for 
effective coordination and eliminated incentives, resulting in a famine that caused an estimated 
30 million deaths! What had happened? 
In 1957 there were 735 000 cooperatives with 119 000 000 member households, or an average 
of 160 households per cooperative. Following the success of the first cooperatives, the Chinese 
government decided in 1958–1959 to extend the collectivization project to all agricultural 
production. The cooperatives were amalgamated into 22 000 communes that covered almost 
the totality of the Chinese territory and comprised an average of 5000 households.  
Prior to 1959, cooperative members had the option of withdrawing (their families’ labour and 
physical capital) in order to possibly join another cooperative if they believed that productivity, 
or their share of the proceeds, were inadequate.  
Various organizational changes were instituted in 1958–59. The right of withdrawal was 
abolished to simplify administration of the system. The compensation method was also changed 
from a redistribution of the benefits based on merit points to a system primarily based on 
members’ needs, independent of productivity. Furthermore, control of each member’s 
contribution, which was possible when there were 160 households in the cooperative who 
could keep an eye on each other, became impossible with 5000 households. Withdrawal of the 
                                                                
86 Marcel Boyer, “L’économie des organisations : mythes et réalités”, Conférence présidentielle (SCSE), Actualité 
économique / Revue d’analyse économique 72, 1996, 247–274. 
87 J.Y. Lin (1990), “Collectivisation and China’s agricultural crisis in 1959–61,” Journal of Political Economy 98, 1228–
52 ; J.Y. Lin and D.T. Yang (2000), “Food Availability, Entitlements and the Chinese Famine of 1959–61,” The 
Economic Journal 110, 136–158. Also see Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Belknap 
Harvard 2011) who writes (page 41): “The misguided Great Leap Forward caused devastation throughout China. 
Starvation was widespread. After peasants were organized in huge communes with mess halls so that more of 
them could work on large poorly planned construction projects or in the fields, they could see that those who 
performed no work were fed as well as the others and they lost any incentive to work, causing a great drop in the 
size of the harvests; many mess halls ran out of food.” 
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member’s right to leave the cooperative and join another voided the threat that made all 
members more productive. 
Although there is no consensus on the specific effect of each one of these organizational 
changes, it is clear that their overall impact on effort and productivity levels was disastrous and 
led to the famine. Intentions were most likely good, but replacing competence and rationality 
with incompetence and ideology ended up causing 30 million deaths! Ultimately, it’s not 
intentions that matter, but competence and results.  China had to wait for the decollectivization 
of the eighties to recoup the productivity levels posted before 1959! 
3.2 The WBCSD reform plan (2010, 2019) 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development is an organization of some 200 large 
companies from all regions of the world dedicated to developing governance focused on the 
pursuit of "real value" rather than the mere pursuit of financial returns. Pursuing real value 
means promoting value creation that takes into account long-term environmental impacts and 
both personal and social well-being and based on prices that integrate all externalities in both 
costs and benefits. It means also (re)orienting capitalism towards the pursuit of true value 
focused on the protection and enhancement of natural, social and financial capital rather than 
on the pursuit of financial profits and economic efficiency. 
The language of the WBCSD makes a distinction between the extraction of value by current 
capitalism and the creation of real value by renewed capitalism. Words matter: extracting value 
versus creating value. Renewed capitalism is a capitalism oriented to all stakeholders rather 
than focused on maximizing shareholder value, internalizing its impacts rather than 
externalizing them, committed to the long-term rather than short-term, 88 focused on 
regeneration rather than on degeneration, and taking responsibility rather than relinquishing it. 
The WBCSD recognizes that capitalism, more specifically the combination of for-profit 
enterprises and competitive markets, has made essential contributions to rising living standards, 
innovation and value creation. But this capitalism, the main source of the historic gains in 
prosperity and progress, has now become the most important threat to the pursuit of this 
development. The future rests on harnessing the power of this marriage between for-profit 
companies and competitive markets for the benefit of real value creation, that is to say, value 
creation that internalizes environmental costs and benefits and social. These costs and benefits 
                                                                
88 See the op-ed of Jamie Dimon (JPMorgan Chase) and Warren E. Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway) of June 6 2018 in 
the Wall Street Journal stressing that short-termism is bad for business that should abandon the quarterly 
objectives in favor of annual or multiannual ones.   
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must be reflected in the relative prices of products, goods and services, in the results 
(profitability) of companies, in the costs of capital and in market valuations. 
Few economists will challenge the plans or reforms of the WBCSD, which closely resemble the 
goals championed by the Business Roundtable. Where the shoe pinches are in the means to 
implement to achieve this better governance. The languages of the WBCSD and the Business 
Roundtable both suffer from a form of suspicious bombast. The virtuous discourse on the 
governance of companies and organizations, public and private, are too often façade discourse 
that conceals a scroll of responsibility allowed and encouraged by the impossibility of a 
performance incentive measure as desired in the beginning.   
Do not bite off more than you can chew, as the adage says. This is somewhat the case with the 
WBCSD and the Business Roundtable programs, virtuous but pursuing the wrong target. Let us 
recall here the affirmation of Vivek Ramaswamy mentioned in the introduction: “The answer is 
not to force capitalism into an arranged marriage with democracy. What we really need is a 
clean divorce.” 
3.3 The key role of competition 
The model of competitive markets can experience drifts if poorly framed and left to itself. The 
competition that is beneficial and generates efficiency and effectiveness, growth and well-being 
is that which corresponds to the precepts of the authors of the analyzes and projects of reform 
of capitalism mentioned above. It is that which is at the base of competitive social democracy 
which we will discuss later. 
This effective competition will be fought by all those who benefit financially, economically or 
politically from its deficiencies or abuses, whether these profiteers are of the rogue capitalist or 
crony capitalist type, of the apparent defender of the public good, ill-informed and in need of 
control power, or the consumer happy to take advantage of a bargain at the wrong price (free 
for example) even if this bargain will in fine harm both their well-being and the well-being of 
their fellow citizens. 
As I will develop below, the real generators of wealth and well-being for all are not low prices 
but right (competitive) prices, i.e. the prices that send the right signals of value and scarcity to 
consumers and producers. These prices are competitive prices, thereby constrained by 
competition or determined by competition or by mechanisms emulating competition.  
I would add that competition authorities should place more emphasis, and have more resources 
to do so, on maintaining competition in the medium and long term by restricting the principle of 
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legal defense of mergers and acquisitions on the basis of potential or expected economies of 
scale or of scope. 
The Tervita case in Canada is a good example of this (Tervita Corp. v Canada Commissioner of 
Competition 2015 SCC 3). The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the merger could be 
completed because the Commissioner had not provided a quantitative measure of the impact of 
the merger on competition. The court has thereby reduced the presumption of beneficial 
maintenance of competition. 89   
Two examples of policies will suffice to illustrate this policy. In order to implement a 
presumption of beneficial development and maintenance of competition, there should be a 
reasoned prohibition of professional licensing requirements when people are not in direct 
contact with the generally poorly informed or uninformed public. Likewise, competition 
authorities should defend and apply relevant total cost sharing rules rather than avoidable cost 
rules in the analysis of predatory pricing practices, in order to emphasize the importance of 
maintaining medium and long-term competition rather than grabbing short-term efficiency 
gains.  
The proposed reform of capitalism presented below, namely the New Competitive Capitalism 
(NCC), revolves around such an effective competition model. 
4. The New Competitive Capitalism (NCC): a ten-point reform 
For economists, the credible agenda is one that focuses on competitive markets, the taxation of 
externalities and the regulation of liability well aligned with the needs of a proper intensity of 
incentives. The right signals are then sent to companies which can pursue search for 
profitability: produce goods and services that are useful to customers, ensure their employees a 
total compensation competitively tied to the value of their best alternative use, compensate 
their suppliers at a level competitively tied to the value of the best alternative use of the goods 
supplied and the services rendered by these suppliers.  
Suppliers are here understood in a broad sense and include suppliers of short term and long 
term environmental and social good and services as well as the suppliers of financial capital, 
both loans and equity, which the companies need to produce the goods and services they 
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intend to offer to their clients. A properly intensive competitive environment will bring 
economic profits (not accounting profits), defined as the difference between revenues and all 
costs, including the properly measured costs of borrowed and equity capital, to zero on average 
or in expected terms.   
 
1. Implement ESG-type programs based on the promotion/development/maintenance of 
competitive prices and markets by inducing firms to include in the formulation of their 
mission their desire to avoid doing business with “heavily” subsidized firms, whether 
suppliers or clients, or at least voice their hesitation/opposition to doing so.  
Insofar as effective competition, competition-emulating institutions and regulations as well as 
competitive prices (including carbon taxes and their equivalent in other fields) are significant 
sources of incentives, innovation, productivity gains and improvement in social wellbeing, an 
ESG-type requirement for firms in the NCC is that they refrain from interacting actively with 
businesses that thrive on public direct or indirect subsidies, at least as much as possible. The 
reason is that the manipulated prices at which the products, goods and services bought or sold 
by such businesses do not represent a credible signal of their value or scarcity. The ultimate 
example is the environment itself whose price may be or is set at an inefficiently low level. It is 
difficult to determine the total amount of such public subsidies, but they are clearly 
astronomical.   
One objective of NCC is therefore procurement and investment policies that oppose price 
manipulations. It would be interesting to develop a price manipulation index by industry, sector, 
region or even country. Price manipulations, whether from the private sector (cartels) or the 
public sector, is antinomic to NCC. The true economic ethic is first and foremost an ethic of 
efficiency and effectiveness based on competitive prices.      
2. Strictly constrain the power of business to intervene in politics and the power of 
politicians to intervene directly in businesses in order to separate/dissociate business 
and politics as well as separate/dissociate capitalism and the process of electoral 
expression in democracy.  
Following Zingalès and Ramaswamy, this divorce between business and politics is an essential 
element of NCC. As I mentioned in the Introduction, competition intensity will favor the 
emergence of efficient firms and the closing of inefficient ones. Competitive markets for factors 
of production and for end products, goods and services, favor the proper value accounting, 
making sure that firms compensate their factors at their best alternative use and commercialize 
valuable goods and services for end consumers and businesses. When all factors of production 
are directly or indirectly priced at their competitive value, and all end products are sold directly 
or indirectly at competitive prices, the firms, competing with each other including forthcoming 
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new innovative firms, will be forced either to use an optimal blend of factors properly 
compensated at their best alternative value (opportunity cost) to produce an appropriate set of 
end products thereby generating a net social value and creating wealth, or go out of business or 
even go bankrupt. There is no need or reason for business to interact with politics, if not to 
pursue anti-competitive advantages.  
The role of CEOs is to be business leaders, not social or political leaders. And the role of social or 
political leaders is not to be business leaders. To each his own profession and Monsieur Séguin's 
goats will be well looked after. 
3. Favor the internalization of significant externalities, in particular in environmental 
degradation (GHG emissions), through the creation of markets, property rights, fiscal 
rules (significant and increasing over time carbon tax) and incentive regulations in such 
a way as to avoid both the tragedy of the commons,90 the tragedy of the 
anticommons,91 as well as a non-optimal use of petrochemical resources and their 
derivatives, and this, to favor the collective wellbeing. 
As the January 2019 consensual statement of economists92 stresses, the best instrument to curb 
carbon emission is a carbon tax that sends a proper price signal to all economic agents, 
consumers, customers and businesses. Efficient and effective regulations emulating such as a 
carbon tax could be considered. The carbon tax should increase annually to reflect 
intertemporal efficiency in managing the stock of GHG in the atmosphere. Similarly, for water 
pollution and other manifestation of market failures. An important characteristic of such 
environmental taxes is social acceptability, which could be enhanced by the fiscal neutrality 
requirement of redistributing the tax proceeds equally among citizens.  
In calibrating such environmental taxes in the use (pollution) of common air and water 
resources, two problems must be overcome. The tragedy of the commons, which refers to the 
overexploitation of common resources under inefficient pricing and regulation, and the tragedy 
                                                                
90 Recall: Garrett Hardin (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 162 (3859), 1243-1248. Hardin writes 
(page 1244): “Adam Smith… contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with 
positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, 
in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumption is correct it justifies the continuance of our 
present policy of laissez-faire in reproduction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual 
fecundity so as to produce the optimum population. If the assumption is not correct, we need to reexamine our 
individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible. The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control… We 
may well call it ‘the tragedy of the commons’." 
91 Heller, Michael A. (1998), “The tragedy of the anticommons - property in the transition from Marx to markets”, 
Harvard Law Review 111 (3): 621–688. Heller writes (page 677): “A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when 
too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting 
separately, may collectively waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a social optimum.”  
92 Recall: https://www.econstatement.org/. 
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of the anti-commons, which refers to the under-exploitation of common resources subjected to 
too many legal or social veto rights. Properly defined pricing, auctions and competition-
emulating regulations are the preferred processes to achieve the avoidance of such tragedies.      
In addition, petrochemical resources and their derivatives generate significant gains in collective 
well-being that we cannot do without. In order to improve the benevolent use of petrochemical 
resources while restricting their polluting uses, in addition to an appropriate carbon tax, 
regulations that favor the maintenance of benevolent uses within a general reduction of uses 
are needed. We may quote Michel Smith:93  
“Look around you: chances are that every object within your field of vision contains 
refined petroleum. The varnish on your desk, the paint on your walls, the finish on 
your floors. Unless the chair you are sitting on is made of untreated wood, then 
your butt is resting on synthetic materials derived from petrochemicals. Plastic is 
petroleum based: the components of your phone and computer, your printer and 
audio speakers. Take a sip of coffee and think about it. The glaze on our mugs 
comes from oil. Oil was once thought to have mystical properties... Oil has been 
linked to medicine ever since. More important. nearly 99% of pharmaceutical 
feedstocks and reagents are derived from petrochemicals. Acetylsalicylic acid, the 
active ingredient in aspirin, for instance, is created by a chemical reaction involving 
petrochemicals. Oil doesn’t simply transport medicine into our systems. It isn’t too 
far off base to say that much of medicine is oil... Refined into kerosene, oil quickly 
came to replace whale fat as the world’s primary illuminate. It was the first spark to 
truly brighten millenniums of darkness. Kerosene made the day longer. It may seem 
mundane now, but at the time, this was described in quasi-religious terms. Like so 
many of the now assimilated effects of life in the carbon age, it is all but impossible 
not to take this for granted, but indoor lighting revolutionized life on earth... As 
citizens of the world, we must begin to treat petroleum with the respect it deserves. 
We must value it, like our very lives, as a precious, almost magical, but certainly 
finite resource. Then we can begin to do the meaningful work that nurtures our 
planet, nurtures our friendships, and creates lives of joy.” 
4. Implement liability rules for environmental/industrial accidents and disasters 
extended to the firm’s partners, whether financial, technological, or management 
consultants, in order to protect active and retired workers and to ensure the quick 
                                                                




clean-up of contaminated site in case of bankruptcy and to induce firms to properly 
manage such risks. 
Limited liability and bankruptcy rules are jointly an impediment to a proper compensation for 
damages. Recall the quote above of Judge Kravitch in the Fleet Factors case. He argued that a 
proper incentive alignment between borrowers and lenders (and insurers) for the protection of 
the environment requires holding deep pocket lenders to be jointly responsible for damages. In 
so doing, creditors will price the risk that they face and debtors will have powerful incentives to 
improve their handling of hazardous wastes. Moreover, creditors will find it in their best interest 
to monitor the hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon 
compliance with standards as a condition of financial support. The same arguments can be 
made for technological providers and possibly management consultants. Inducing a proper 
accounting of (all) costs and benefits of business activities including the risk of bankruptcy is a 
pillar of the NCC. 
As a complementary tool to induce firms, more precisely its higher level managers and the 
members of its board of directors to properly manage risks, an incentive compatible 
compensation system and formulas need to be developed and implemented. I will not go 
further down this road in this paper.94     
5. Abolish taxes on corporate profits to encourage businesses to better focus their 
attention on fulfilling their mission and to favor investments in R&D, productivity 
gains, which are significant contributing factors to growth and social well-being.  
Abolishing taxes on corporate profits, if it were generalized, would render irrelevant the fiscal 
competition between countries to attract businesses on their territory. The acrimonious 
discussions on whether fiscal competition between countries allows firms to avoid paying their 
fair share of taxes through fiscal optimization and tax avoidance schemes (a waste of 
management competencies) would become irrelevant.  
We often hear that GAFA+ (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Netflix), to take a 
well-known example, avoid paying their fair share of taxes. It is somewhat a matter of 
viewpoint. I estimate, on the basis of their total payroll, that income and consumption taxes 
paid by their employees may have reached more than some US$32 billion in 2018-19. If we 
were to add taxes paid by their shareholders on dividends and capital gains, we would find out 
                                                                
94 Readers interested in that subject can take a look at Marcel Boyer, “The Twelve Principles of Incentive Pay”, Revue 
d’Économie Politique 121(3), Dalloz, 2011, 285-306.   
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that abolishing taxes on profits would have barely perceptible net impacts  if any on 
governments’ revenues.95 
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Tax systems have reached a worrying level of complexity, favoring many types and forms of 
exemptions and loopholes, even cronyism. This is a major obstacle to an efficient allocation of 
resources, investments as well as R&D and innovation efforts. Economic theory could be better 
used in a concerted manner to reorganize the tax system to offer citizens and businesses the 
best incentives to use scarce resources and develop competencies to maximize the well-being of 
all. 
6. Expand free trade (interregional and international) while respecting partners’ 
preexisting conditions, that is, their different stages of economic development.  
Political leaders can frequently be heard affirming the principles and benefits of international 
trade and lamenting the harm caused by tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to trade, which only 
generate unnecessary and unjustified costs on all sides of borders to the detriment of countries’ 
national security, workers, and citizens. However, these leaders, often supported by business 
leaders and unions’ representatives, often follow up with assurances that they are committed to 
protecting the interests of workers in industries likely to be affected by a greater opening of 
                                                                
95 For data on worldwide payroll of the S&P 500 firms, see Marcel Boyer, “CEO Pay in Perspective”, CIRANO 2019s-
33, 52 pages. (http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2019s-33.pdf, also TSE WP 1059 https://www.tse-




borders to trade. In so doing, they are prone to echo nearly word-for-word the statements 
made by those who seek to limit free trade through tariffs and other barriers.  
In the same vein, some might want to use free trade and its expected benefits as leverage to 
persuade or incentivize potential trading partners to change their economic, social, or 
environmental policies. Thus, they might oppose free trade with potential partners because of 
the latters’ policies, or lack of policies, on matters such as working conditions and worker safety, 
child labour, pollution, deforestation, laws protecting physical and intellectual property, laws 
governing competition (antitrust), etc. This use of free-trade agreements, while not wholly 
unreasonable and unjustified, too often conceals the goal of shielding economic, social, labour-
union, cultural, or environmental (green) vested interests. 
Too often the specificities of the partners are ignored under the cover of lofty posturing. 
Development takes time, and we cannot reasonably expect a poorer partner to immediately 
adopt policies and lifestyle adjustments that wealthier partners defined, adopted, and delivered 
over a period of fifty years or more. An operational free-trade agreement may well be the best 
way to nudge a poorer country along and help it develop harmoniously while allowing the 
developed country to benefit from its comparative advantages.                    
Similarly, we are also likely to hear political and economic leaders call for preferential treatment 
for “made locally” over “made abroad” and put their words into action by showing themselves 
very generous towards chosen businesses and industries that they deemed meritorious, 
essential, or national champions.96  
I argued elsewhere97 that these are essentially examples of a populist pitch, based on poorly 
conducted empirical studies, academic and otherwise, and representative of crony capitalism. 
Rather than focussing on the true determinants of economic and social wellbeing and 
contributing to a better understanding of how the interregional or international economy 
works, they prefer to play the role of big spender, dispensing other people’s money, while 
banking on the ignorance and self-interested credulity of a non-negligible subgroup of the 
population and its elites. Those are not courses of action compatible with NCC. 
Expanding free trade is a pillar of NCC as it increase the intensity of competition and the value of 
innovation, hence the wellbeing of all partners.  
                                                                
96 We often see the same leaders criticize similar policies by their trade partners. It is the pot calling the kettle 
black.  
97 See Marcel Boyer, « Free Trade and Economic Policies: A Critique of Empirical Reason (The Working Paper 
Version) », CIRANO 2020s-56, November 2020. http://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2020s-56.pdf ; TSE WP #20-
1166 EN https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1166_en.pdf,  
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7. In order to make concrete the presumption of beneficial development and 
maintenance of competition, favor the protection of competitors and new entrants 
against potential anti-competitive practices of incumbent firms through tougher legal 
constraints (Competition Act) on restrictive trade practices (refusal to deal, predatory 
pricing, price maintenance, tied sales, abuse of dominant position, etc.) , thereby 
allowing creative destruction to play its role.  
Philippe Aghion and his co-authors argue convincingly that creative destruction is a fundamental 
factor of innovation, growth and social well being. Indeed, American quarterly data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics98  show how net job creation is resulting from a process of gross job 
creation and destruction. In the following Table, we observe that each net job created in the 
period 1992.III till 2008.I (62 quarters) resulted on average from 19.4 jobs created and 18.4 jobs 
lost in private sector establishments, while each net job created in the immediate post-(2008-
2010) recession from 2010.II to 2013.IV (15 quarters) was the result of an average of 11.9 jobs 
created and 10.9 jobs lost.  
Period Gross jobs created 
/ quarter 
Gross jobs lost / 
quarter 
Net jobs / quarter. 
1992.III – 2007.IV 7.904 M 7.497 M 407 K 
2008.I – 2010.I 6.619 M 7.654 M -1040 K 
2010.II – 2011.IV 6.869 M 6.355 M 514 K 
2010.II – 2013.IV 6.981 M 6.394 M 586 K 
2014.I – 2019.IV 7.480 M 6.957 M 523 K 
During the more recent period from 2014.I to 2019.IV (24 quarters), each net job created was 
the result of 14.3 jobs created and 13.3 jobs lost. The process of job gains and losses is complex 
and involves large employment movements throughout the economy. This is creative 
destruction at work. 
Creative destruction could be significantly impaired by two public policies: (i) the use by 
antitrust authorities of the criterion of avoidable cost to infer if a firm has engaged in illegal 
predatory pricing and (ii) the government policy of providing public subsidies to enhance some 
firms’ competitiveness or protection against competitors. 
                                                                
98 https://www.bls.gov/bdm/ . 
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Regarding the first policy, a pro-competition NCC stance would be to replace the avoidable-cost 
criterion,99 which is relatively easy to manipulate and a source of never ending disputes on 
definition,100 by a more direct full-cost sharing among products criterion more favorable to 
competition: all products sold by a firm, goods and services or access to a route or branch of a 
network (a route of an airline for instance), would be attributed a share of total costs, defining 
the minimum price it must charge, with total shares summing to 100%. The change would 
reduce resource allocation efficiency in the short run in favor for a more intense competition in 
the medium and long run.101  
Regarding the second policy, one transparent NCC way to proceed in the context of this type of 
program would be to auction off specific government assistance projects, thus transferring to a 
local or international private financial consortium responsibility for honouring the grant, loan, 
loan guarantee, or the capital injection. This consortium would assume responsibility for the 
outlays and benefit from repayments at levels and under conditions determined by the 
government assistance project, in exchange for a premium paid by the government to the 
winning consortium.102  
The main advantage of auctioning government assistance programs is to nip in the bud the 
ubiquitous risk of a creeping crony or collusive capitalism at the expense not only of 
competition intensity but also of citizens and taxpayers, and of the companies themselves, no 
matter how grandiloquent the intentions expressed by the government and interested 
stakeholders. Transparency serves competition.  
                                                                
99 Le critère des coûts évitables (Baumol) veut qu’un prix est un prix d’éviction s’il ne permet pas à l’entreprise de 




avoidable-cost-test-diverges-dramatically-from-us-approach     
101 See Marcel Boyer (2017), “Challenges and Pitfalls in Competition Policy Implementation”, Joint State of the Art 
Lecture (Canadian Economics Association, Atlantic Canada Economics Association, CIRANO, UBC Phelps Centre for 
the Study of Government and Business, and University of Toronto Rotman Institute for International Business),     
St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish NS, June 4 2017.   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9LUdeYe4dQ&t=1560s at 1h10m25s. 
102 See Marcel Boyer (2017, above in footnote 80) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9LUdeYe4dQ&t=1560s at 
1h15m40s. See also Marcel Boyer (2020), « A Pervasive Economic Fallacy in Assessing the Cost of Public Funds », 




8. In the analysis of mergers and acquisitions, implement a legal requirement to use a 
relative weight ratio larger than one to balance competition impairment effects versus 
efficiency gains, for instance a 2 to 1 ratio or even a 3 to 1 ratio. 
In their contribution to the 50th anniversary issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics, Boyer, 
Ross and Winter (2017)103 argue that  
“Provisions to protect Canadians from anticompetitive mergers have been part 
of Canadian competition law since the passage of the first Combines 
Investigation Act in 1910, which replaced an earlier law that had focused solely 
on price-fixing and related practices.  Canadian merger law, however, was almost 
nonexistent until the passage of the Competition Act in 1986… Under the 
Canadian standard, consumers can be harmed by the loss of competition 
attributable to the merger and yet the merger may be allowed if the gains in 
efficiency “will be greater than, and will offset” the effects flowing from the loss 
of competition… Perhaps the most notable of all merger cases under the new 
law has been the Superior Propane (2003) case. In defending this merger, the 
efficiency exemption was invoked by the merging parties and the Tribunal had to 
address directly the welfare standard to be applied.  Despite new arguments 
from the Commissioner that the appropriate standard is not the total welfare 
standard, the Tribunal initially took the view that the total welfare standard was 
exactly the right basis on which to trade off harms to competition and 
efficiencies…”  
Balancing the potential harm of a merger or acquisition can do to consumers and competition 
itself and the potential gains in efficiencies through economies of scale, scope, network, and 
others is certainly a very difficult task. Among the challenges to be addressed, the fact that the 
analysis must be done on the basis of “potential” impacts not yet observed is clearly at the top. 
Another difficulty is to ascertain which criterion to use to “balance” the impacts, which calls for 
weights to apply to impact measures of different quality.  
By taking a clear stance in favor of maintaining and encouraging competition in the medium 
and long run, the NCC calls for a relative weight ratio of 2 to 1 of competition harm over gains 
in efficiency, whatever the methods used to measure the impacts. 
9. Implement incentive regulation mechanisms to ensure access to networks, platforms, 
and essential licences and patents, at fair, resonable and non discriminatory (FRAND) 
                                                                
103 Marcel Boyer, Thomas W. Ross, Ralph A. Winter, “The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian 
perspective”, Canadian Journal of Economics 50(5), 50th Anniversary Issue, December 2017, 1489-1524.  
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prices and conditions on the basis of full cost sharing, including the value of real 
options exercised. 
There are two broad approaches to the financing of network infrastructure. One stems from the 
cost-sharing of network costs, in particular the cost of investment, among key partners and 
users of the network. This approach relies mainly, in its purest and most rigorous form, on the 
theory of cooperative games104.  The other stems from the pricing of (regulated) access to the 
network, which is assumed to have been developed by a particular firm, the network owner. 
Different potential users of the network, including competitors, may wish to use the network or 
at least some critical or essential parts of it, rather than build an alternative to it.  
With the advent of internet networks and platforms for e-information, e-communication,  
e-commerce, and more, the risk of seeing new forms of market power is real. To manage and 
circumvent such risks, the regulation of access to networks and platforms through adequate 
competitive pricing and conditions, first developed for telecommunications, is taking center 
stage.  
It is important to remember that “It is more the end product that counts: connectivity, 
flexibility, safety, dependability, accessibility, capacity (high speed and broadband), security, and 
user-friendliness. The demand expressed by consumers for different telecommunications 
devices (wireline, wireless, cellular mobile, satellite-based mobile, Internet Protocol IP 
telephony, and platforms, and so on) is a derived demand rather than a direct demand.”105 In 
that sense, e-communication, e-commerce, and e-information networks and platforms are like 
highways on which communication, commerce, and information goods and services travel. 
Rather than being free, those internet highways are or may be tolled ones. In some cases, 
duplicating highways is not an efficient option. Hence the need for some regulation of access.  
Calibrating such access rules, pricing and conditions is a difficult, information-intensive task. 
Among the possible approaches, one competition-emulating formula may hold much promise, 
namely the Laffont-Tirole global price cap (GPC) formula defined on the prices of products and 
services sold and the price of access granted.106 The two main advantages of GPC are first to 
                                                                
104 See Boyer, M., Moreaux, M., Truchon, M., Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures, Monographie 
CIRANO, février 2006, 340 pages. https://cirano.qc.ca/fr/sommaires/2006MO-01; and Boyer, M., Marchetti, N., 
“Principes de choix d’une méthode économique d’allocation : partage des coûts et tarification à Gaz de France” 
(mars 2006), CIRANO 2007-RP07, 131 pages. http://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2007RP-07.pdf 
105 Boyer, M. “The Measure and Regulation of Competition in Telecommunications Markets”, chapter 5 in 
Gentzoglanis, A. and A. Henten (Eds.), Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010. 
106 See Boyer, M. and Robert, J., “Competition and Access in Electricity Markets : ECPR, Global Price Cap and 
Auctions”, pp. 47–74 in G. Zaccour (ed.), Deregulation of Electric Utilities, Kluwer Academic Pub, 1998. 
82 
 
follow theoretical precepts and second to require less information than the other schemes. 
The global price cap considers both the final products and services prices and the access 
charges in one single price cap formula. Once the price cap is determined, the incumbent 
firm is free to choose its prices, including the access charges, as long as the global price 
cap is satisfied.107  
The new regulatory framework should rest on three specific principles of economic efficiency: 
The pursuit of a dynamic regulatory approach based on implementing proper competition 
processes and information systems; The promotion of competition through proper incentives 
ensuring dynamically efficient access prices and conditions and efficient investment programs in 
network maintenance and development; The design of non-predatory pricing rules through full 
cost sharing, including the value of real options exercised to build the network, to promote the 
emergence of a more competitive industry, even if such rules reduce static efficiency (see #7 
above). 
10. Reaffirm that capitalism is synonymous with radicalism and disruption (The Economist, 
above), not with managed and soft competition. In that spirit, “abusive” non-compete 
clauses and professional certification requirements (for firms and individuals who do 
not interact with the uninformed or poorly informed public) as well as various forms of 
employer and union lobbying which aims to restrict and reduce competition must be 
discarded, abolished or even made illegal, in order to restore competition to its central 
place in an economy dedicated to social wellbeing. 
Rather than enumerate a long list of measures to be discarded because they are harmful to 
healthy competition, let us consider the particular but very evocative and representative case of 
the construction industry.108 Current regulations restricting the mobility of construction workers 
across different regions of Québec come from a particular historical situation and these 
regulations appear today as a relic of another age. It persists because it protects through a 
crony form of managed competition some companies, trade unions as well as regulatory bodies 
against competition, to the detriment of citizens.  
While these regulations may have had beneficial effects during the era decades ago of major 
inter-union conflicts in the industry, today it has perverse effect on efficiency and economic 
                                                                
107 In technical terms, the firm implements the Ramsey price structure if it knows its demand and cost 
functions. There is no need for the regulator to find and measure as before those demand and cost 
conditions and elasticities. 
108 Comments made here come from Marcel Boyer (2018), Analyse économique relativement à la mobilité des 





growth. Regional development, including the development of construction in the regions, can 
be better served by opening up to competition and mobility, which should be encouraged 
rather than restricted. Such an opening would allow a better allocation of resources, labor and 
capital, a better match between supply and demand in the construction labor market, faster 
penetration of best practices, better skills development, productivity gains and cost control, all 
translating into gains in individual and collective well-being.  
As mentioned above, economic development depends on four key factors, which are (i) the 
quantity and quality of skills (human capital), (ii) the capacity of inventing and innovating at the 
technological, organizational and social areas, (iii) the quality and intensity of performance 
incentive mechanisms, and (iv) the quality of mechanisms for allocating private and public 
resources (the right resources in the right places at the right times) and mechanisms for 
coordination (consistency and coherence of the many or even countless decisions of economic 
agents). The regulation of mobility in the construction industry in Quebec significantly impedes 
the last two factors.   
The findings and messages that can be drawn from academic research and analysis of local and 
foreign public policies relating to worker mobility run counter to current regulations on mobility 
in the Québec construction industry. The NCC has no room for such counterproductive 
regulations.  
However, some certification of competencies may still be valuable as a credible “proof” of 
competencies and experience even if the client is not a member of the so-called uninformed or 
poorly informed public. If that is so, market-based certification systems should be the preferred 
way to see it developed. Some firms may decide to use certified workers while others may 
develop their own internal verification process. The main challenge is to avoid a reduction or 
restriction of competition through arbitrary certification measures.109 
5. The Competitive Social-democracy (CSD): a ten-point plan  
Begun in the 1960s and early 1970s, the policies of the welfare state and its many reforms are 
now under threat, as the public programs provided by this model (education, healthcare, 
retirement, and the social safety net in general) are weighing down government budgets in a 
world of tax competition.  
                                                                
109 For example, « economist » is not a title that is reserved or certified. Anyone can self-declare economist. A firm 
or a university may wish to recruit an economist, who graduated from a well-known recognized school or 
university, but nothing should prevent it from recruiting an autodidact economist if it is satisfied with his/her 
pedigree or can assess his/her competency. 
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This has given rise to a fundamental dilemma: In a society that has become richer and more 
productive, public and social goods and services have become more costly (opportunity cost), 
giving rise to substantial pressures to reduce their level and coverage. Why not reduce their cost 
by improving productivity and fostering innovation through competition? 
Criticism of “conventional social democracy” and “conventional neo-conservatism” or 
“conventional neoliberalism” is anchored in the widespread perception that markets cannot 
solve all problems and that efficient governments are as necessary as efficient markets for 
ensuring maximal growth and optimizing overall wellbeing.  
We need to find something else—a new social-political-economic philosophy—together with an 
efficient set of policies aimed at the production, distribution, and delivery of an appropriate set 
of public and social goods and services. A model in which goals and objectives are adequately 
defined; in which the ways and means are determined by effectiveness and efficiency; in which 
political and economic rights and freedoms, including the right to challenge and replace existing 
providers of public and social goods and services (PSGS), are reaffirmed; and in which 
transparent competitive processes, the ultimate embodiment of equality of opportunity, 
innovation, and motivation, are encouraged.  
This new program is the Competitive Social Democracy (CSD).110 
4.1 The new roles of the governmental and competitive sectors 
The dichotomy between public and private and the dichotomy between left and right are today 
at the heart of all discussions on the reform of the traditional socio-economic system, whether 
it refers to the welfare state or the social democratic state.  
These dichotomies create unnecessary conflicts because they stem from a fundamental 
misunderstanding or confusion between, on the one hand, the objectives to be pursued in 
terms of the quantity and quality of public and social goods and services (PSGS) to be provided 
to the community and its citizens and on the other hand the processes and means by which 
these objectives will be pursued.  
It is high time to replace the public sector / private sector dichotomy with a government sector / 
competitive sector dichotomy. And this is not just a matter of terminology. The dichotomy 
between the government sector and the competitive sector, both with clear responsibilities for 
                                                                
110 Marcel Boyer, Manifeste pour une Social-Démocratie Concurrentielle v2.0 / Manifesto for a Competitive Social-
Democracy v2.0, à paraitre en 2021, ≈275 pages. The April 2009 version is available on CIRANO website in French 
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/manifeste and English http://www.cirano.qc.ca/manifesto. See also Marcel Boyer, 
« L’État providence et la Social-démocratie de l’avenir », L’ÉNA hors les murs, no 500 (octobre 2020), 72-74. 
85 
 
maximizing the well-being of citizens, becomes crucial. It is at the heart of a true welfare state 
and a true social democracy. 
The confusion between the social, economic and political objectives and the means to pursue 
those goals has favored the development of gargantuan government bureaucracies protected 
from competition and subjected or even opened to capture by parallel partisan, trade union and 
technocratic powers, which often fight but always cumulate, to the detriment of the citizens 
who are the end beneficiaries and funders of the system. 
In the social democratic model of the future (CSD), the competitive sector is broadly defined to 
include the sectors of private companies, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), non-profit enterprises (NPOs), as well as other so-called civil society and social economy 
organizations. These organizations in the competitive sector are called upon to respond to open 
and transparent calls for tenders, launched by the government sector, to obtain the right and 
the duty to produce and distribute, for a given period of time and generally renewable, well-
defined public and social goods and services (PSGS). The contracts thereby concluded will 
specify the rights, responsibilities, commitments and compensation of the stakeholders. 
In the field of PSGS, the design of baskets holds a preponderant place given the complexity of 
the network of PSGS. This basket design is likely to be better managed centrally, so that 
synchronization, complementarities and externalities are optimized. Thus, the design of PSGS is 
fundamentally an area that is well suited to the government sector. Through the electoral 
process, the various parties and political entities offer baskets of PSGS, including the terms of 
their funding, to citizens who are asked to choose between these baskets by voting for the party 
offering the one they prefer. The aggregation of preferences is achieved through a democratic, 
open and transparent electoral process. 
Contracts between the government sector and competitive sector organizations must be 
designed in such a way that the competitive entity selected is led to achieve the objectives and 
respect the commitments made, through a system of guarantees and incentive compensation. 
By calibrating the duration of the contract to the useful life of the equipment and the project 
governance strategy, the government sector ensures that the selected entity will provide a 
sustainable management of operations and risks in the short, medium and long term. 
A crucial element of good governance is the financial structure of projects. While government 
lenders have little interest in monitoring the use of funds111 and therefore ensuring the 
                                                                
111 Marcel Boyer, « Erreurs méthodologiques dans l’évaluation des projets d’investissement », Revue Française 
d’Économie XXXIII (2018/4), avril 2019, 49-80. https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-economie-2018-4-page-
49.htm) ; Marcel Boyer, Éric Gravel et Sandy Mokbel, Évaluation de projets publics : risques, coût de financement et 
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effectiveness and efficiency of project implementation and management, a competitive sector 
company lenders carefully monitor the quality of its governance and as such are privileged, 
informed and interested monitors. 
Appropriate competition policies can and should ensure that the level playing field rules are 
strictly observed, in particular the antitrust, anticartel and antimonopoly rules, within the 
framework of a policy explicitly favorable to upstream competition (between suppliers and 
between trade union organizations, among others) and downstream (between retailers and 
between assemblers of products and services, among others). The tendering process itself 
should be adequately repeated at regular intervals ranging from a few months to a few years 
depending on the good or service considered. 
Competition between suppliers, producers and distributors, under contract with the 
government sector, is essential to allow the establishment of a diversified multisource supply, 
favorable to objective assessment, benchmarking and innovation, and better performance 
incentives. 
This characterization of the roles of the governmental and competitive sectors in the welfare 
state and Social Democracy of the future helps avoid conflicts of interest that undermine the 
effectiveness of traditional models where the activities of design, financing, supply (production 
and distribution) and evaluation are all typically the responsibility of a single organization, 
namely the public sector. 
These conflicts of interest are endemic in the traditional models and promote scheming, 
opacity, backroom wheeling and dealing, and the granting of undue privileges, all at the 
expense of citizens, consumers and taxpayers. A separation of roles and responsibilities allows 
credible accountability and performance incentive mechanisms to be put in place, which are at 
best fuzzy and manipulable and at worst non-existent in traditional models. 
In the area of infrastructure (roads, water, parks, airports, etc.), the government sector defines 
the goods and services to be offered to the population, launches calls for tenders from the 
competitive sector and manages the resulting contracts and partnerships, whether of PPP type 
or other, adequately linked with performance and this, in the best interest of citizens, users and 
taxpayers.112 
                                                                
coût du capital, Commentaire #388, Institut C.D. Howe (2013). 
https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentaire_388_0.pdf  
112 Marcel Boyer, “Défis et embûches dans l’évaluation des PPP : Pour un secteur public efficace et efficient”, 
CIRANO 2020s-25, 45 pages. https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2020s-25.pdf ;                                                                 
TSE WP 20-1104 https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1104.pdf 
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In the health sector, the processes are similar taking into account the particular requirements 
that the various upstream (investments) and downstream (service provision) activities may 
represent: the government sector defines the health goods and services to be offered and the 
objectives to be achieved, in terms of quantity and quality, launches calls for tenders from the 
competitive sector and manages contracts and partnerships, whether PPP or other, adequately 
incentivizing performance, in the best interest of citizens, users -patients and taxpayers. The 
quantity and quality of the services actually rendered and observed must be measured with 
complete independence, transparency and objectivity according to the terms provided for in the 
contract. Compensation from the competitive sector partner will depend in part on the results 
of this objective assessment. 
In the field of education, the processes are similar taking into account the particular 
requirements that can represent the various activities upstream (investments) and downstream 
(provision of services): the government sector defines the goods and services to be offered and 
the objectives to be achieved, in terms of quantity and quality of educational services and 
proper achievement of academic success, launches calls for tenders from the competitive sector 
and manages contracts and partnerships, of PPP type or other, adequately linked to 
performance, in the best interest of citizens, pupils, students and taxpayers. The quantity and 
quality of the services actually rendered and observed must be measured with complete 
independence, transparency and objectivity according to the terms provided for in the contract. 
Compensation from the competitive sector partner will depend in part on the results of this 
independent assessment. 
Competitive processes and performance incentives are thus found at the heart of the PSGS 
production and distribution system, respectful of competitive sector suppliers and in the best 
interest of citizens, users and taxpayers. 
4.2 The CSD ten generic policies and programmes 
The Competitive Social Democracy model rests on ten major and ambitious generic policies and 
programs:  
1. Clearly define the core competencies of the governmental and competitive sectors. 
The core competencies of the governmental sector are first, the identification of citizens’ needs 
in terms of public and social goods and services, both in quantity and quality; second, the design 
of proper mechanisms through which conflicts between different baskets of goods and services 
and between different coalitions of citizens will be arbitrated; and third, the management of 




contracts and partnerships with competitive-sector organizations for the production, 
distribution and delivery of the chosen basket of public and social goods and services.  
The core competencies of the competitive sector are to produce, distribute and deliver the 
private as well as the public and social goods and services, the latter under contract with the 
governmental sector, by making use of the best forms of organization and the most efficient 
combinations of factors, human resources and technologies. 
2. Promote open and transparent competitive mechanisms in the attribution of contracts 
for the production, distribution, and delivery of public and social goods and services. 
For competitive mechanisms to be broadly accepted, a significant effort must be undertaken to 
promote the liberalization, dissemination and better understanding of economic laws and rules. 
The emergence and omnipresence of competitive prices and processes throughout the 
economy, in the public and social goods and services sectors in particular, constitute significant 
forces aimed at avoiding waste and at generating and implementing innovative solutions to 
problems and challenges and, in that regard, must be understood as a significant endeavour of 
the CSD model and project. To achieve such results, it is important that the attribution of 
contracts be realized through open and transparent processes, exempt of favouritism and 
predatory behaviour. Competitive-sector organizations must face a level playing field; if some 
advantage should be given to particular participating organizations, it should be announced and 
quantified in a clear way at the outset. 
3. Favour the creation and development of efficient competitive-sector organizations 
with a capacity to bid efficiently for public and social goods and services contracts. 
The emergence of competitive markets for the partnership contracts for the production, 
distribution and delivery of public and social goods and services requires that a sufficient 
number of organizations be present in the tendering process. It is a fundamental responsibility 
of the governmental sector to make sure that contract-award processes be exempt of 
significant expression of market power by competitive-sector organizations. Those competitive-
sector organizations must be capable of submitting credible offers in a level playing field contest 
for governmental contracts.  
In order to achieve the highest level of efficiency, it is preferable, if not necessary, for the 
government to explicitly favour, through an adequate programme of training and counselling, 
the development of competencies through the creation and development of efficient 
competitive-sector organizations without interfering directly in the contract-allocation 
processes. Such a policy would, in the long run, be much more efficient than trying to tilt the 
balance towards preferred-offspring organizations. 
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4. Promote the emergence of competitive prices and mechanisms (market creation) in all 
sectors of the economy, including the public and social goods and services sectors. 
The competitive mechanisms are the most efficient mechanisms allowing citizens and 
organizations to make choices based on appropriate information. The manipulation of prices by 
sending biased signals or indicators of relative costs and scarcity of goods and services has 
become a major source of social and economic waste in our societies. Such manipulations imply 
that individuals are induced to make inefficient consumption and investment decisions, while 
firms and organizations in all sectors, including public and social goods and services sectors, 
such as health and education for instance, are induced to make production, investment and 
R&D choices that are oriented more towards the interests, wishes and private objectives of 
price manipulating political authorities and well-organized interest groups rather than towards 
the needs and demands of their patients, students, customers and clients.  
Confronted to adequate indicators (competitive prices and processes), individuals as well as 
firms and organizations, can adapt their consumption and production activities, including their 
investments in human capital (portfolio of competencies), in R&D, and innovation efforts, to the 
relative social value of those activities, as reflected in competitive prices. In some cases, 
efficient well-informed decision-making will require the creation and development of 
competitive markets in lieu of traditional bureaucratic, autocratic, and centralized decision-
making by, more often than not, poorly informed social engineering planners whose special 
interests eventually always dominate those of the people. This is inexorably and most 
perniciously the case even with well-intentioned political or social leaders playing as gods 
imposing their own tutelary preferences.  
This is not to say that it is never appropriate for political or social leaders to convince people of 
the desirability of better behaviour, but rather that it is always better to proceed if possible 
through competitive institutions and mechanisms, respecting the autonomy and fostering the 
responsibility of citizens. 
5. Favour modularity, flexibility, experimentation and change through multiple sourcing. 
Innovation, not only technological but also organizational, must rely on an explicit process by 
which experimentation and change become normal if not frequent or continuous. In order to 
reduce the costs of innovation generation, selection and implementation, and, therefore, of 
favouring the emergence of an innovative society, the governmental sector must explicitly 
develop a multiple-sourcing policy in the attribution of contracts. Multiple sourcing means that 
no single competitive-sector organization should be allowed to monopolize or dominate a 




In order to favour competition among providers and to identify those capable of higher 
performance in the production, distribution and delivery of public and social goods and services, 
it is essential that some level of modularity and experimentation be continuously undertaken 
under proper safeguards allowing the evaluation of new ways and means so implemented, the 
objective being to implement real-world best practices as consistently as possible. By explicitly 
favouring multiple sourcing, the governmental sector must aim to encourage a proper level of 
modularity and experimentation in the provision of public and social goods and services, and in 
so doing, favour the research and discovery of better ways and means.  
6. Develop efficient mechanisms and institutions for better adaptation by individuals as 
well as by firms and organizations to changes brought by creative destruction. 
A significant source of opposition to socio-economic change, even when such change appears 
desirable, is the absence of efficient mechanisms or institutions allowing individuals and firms to 
reduce their own direct cost of adaptation to such changes. The following three factors are 
equally important for the improvement of social well-being: first, the flexibility to adapt to 
changes and the willingness to take on new challenges posed by exogenous and endogenous 
changes in a volatile socio-economic environment; second, the capacity of the education sector 
to respond to industrial and social needs in terms of required skills and competencies of 
different types; third, the importance and efficiency of R&D investments in generating new 
ideas and useful products and services.  
Hence, the flexibility to adapt to a volatile environment must be a characteristic of all sectors 
producing and distributing private as well as public and social goods and services. Flexibility runs 
against inertia that fear of change often generate. Unless people are given the reasons for 
change and the tools to manage such change, they will resist it in the economic and political 
arenas. Therefore, the level of social flexibility towards change will depend on the existence of 
institutions (tools and means; organizations and markets) allowing individuals, firms and 
different levels of government to efficiently manage risks and opportunities that volatility in the 
socio-economic environment represents. A proper set of institutions to manage the risk faced in 
change is a prerequisite for a flexible society, that is, for a society where innovation, both 
technological and organizational, thrives for the benefit of all. 
7. Promote direct and transparent policies of income and wealth support in fighting the 
development of dependence for individuals as well as for firms and organizations. 
It is normal and expected that, in any efficient society, a certain number of individuals will end 
up making or having taken wrong decisions with dire and socially undesirable and even 
unacceptable consequences. Hence, a public programme of income and wealth support is not 
only necessary but also conducive to growth enhancement and social well-being improvement 
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for all. But such public programmes must be efficiently designed and implemented. In lieu of the 
paternalistic control and manipulation of prices that have often been the preferred policy in the 
past, the CSD model and project propose to implement direct and transparent policies of 
income and wealth support with strong incentives for the beneficiaries to get out of them. 
Moreover, it is desirable that those income and wealth support mechanisms not only be 
integrated, direct, efficient and incentive compatible, but also developed under the 
responsibility of one single government authority in order to increase governmental 
accountability in that matter.  
A CSD policy towards the needy, the unlucky, and the poor must be as empathetic as possible. 
This objective requires that the policy be aiming strongly at avoiding the development of 
dependence, for the well-being of the beneficiaries themselves. If properly designed, an income 
and wealth support programme can be both empathetic and dependence-free. It is imperative 
that beneficiaries be properly induced to leave public income and wealth-support programmes 
fruitfully, successfully, and as soon and efficiently as possible, allowing better and more 
generous programmes to be designed and implemented. It is imperative, for instance, that the 
implicit tax rates imposed on the unemployed and the social welfare recipients as they find a 
part-time or full-time employment be adjusted and calibrated to persuade them to find and 
accept those jobs. Similarly, governmental support and subsidies of all types and forms, 
including those intended to help and support competitive-sector firms and organizations that 
are facing particularly sudden difficult times or competitive environments, must be continuously 
reassessed and made equally as transparent, publicly accountable and incentive compatible as 
possible.  
8. Foster regular, systematic, transparent, independent and credible evaluations of public 
programmes and policies. 
All government programmes should contain sunset clauses so that their role and efficiency can 
be reassessed on a regular basis. Independent and credible organizations and bodies, using 
state-of-the-art and transparent methodologies, while also being open to the scrutiny and 
criticisms of the public, should be called to perform such evaluation. In many, even in most 
cases, the current socio-economic evaluation of governmental programmes proceeds from 
improper, disputable and self-serving methodologies. Programmes aimed at (regional) job 
creation, fostering investments in specific sectors, as well as programmes intended to favour 
the reinsertion of the long-term or seasonally-unemployed persons, are all examples of public 
programmes costing vast sums of money with practically no significant tangible results.  
It is not the goals and objectives of those programmes that are flawed, but rather their 
implementation. The current evaluation procedures of such programmes are not only dubious, 
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but are most often reduced to nothing more than a means to justify (ex-post) a bad politically 
motivated decision. The CSD model and project reject those shabby evaluation procedures and 
methodologies in favour of systematic, transparent, independent and credible evaluations. By 
stressing the need for more rigorous and regular evaluation procedures, in addition to requiring 
that the programmes be subject to competitive processes leading to incentive contracts for 
those organizations chosen to produce and/or deliver public and social goods and services, the 
CSD model and project will favour programmes that are better designed and better 
implemented. 
9. Reform taxation to make it effective, cohesive, inclusive, simple and incentive-
compatible to induce contributions to social well-being. 
To reconcile the needs for performance incentives, flexibility in labor markets, efficiency in the 
use of our resources and therefore truth in (competitive) prices while ensuring for each 
individual and each household a decent standard of living, it is necessary to develop a simpler, 
incentive, cohesive and inclusive taxation system. 
The fundamental change needed in government funding revolves around designing a taxation 
system capable of achieving two goals: first to generate balanced funding of public and social 
goods and services and second to provide the appropriate incentives to individuals and 
organizations to contribute to the well-being of their fellow citizens mainly through their 
decisions about participating in the labor force (how, where and at what level of effort) and 
about developing and marketing products and services of proper design and quality. 
To achieve this objective, it is important to implement the following: 
a) Favor taxation at the level of consumption (such as GST or VAT, to be included in 
the prices displayed in order to promote price transparency) rather than income 
in order to create the least possible distortions in the decisions of taxpayers 
(efficiency of taxation), in particular in their decisions to participate in the labor 
force;  
b) If some level of income taxation is to be maintained (while we move towards 
consumption taxation), decrease the implicit marginal tax rates of the 
unemployed or socially assisted when they manage to find full-time or part-time 
jobs, reduce the marginal tax rates applicable to significant increases in earnings 
and remuneration from one year to the next, and reduce income tax rates and 
their complexity (number of levels) while including all income in the tax base 
while imposing a minimum rate applicable on overall income in order to promote 
social inclusion;  
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c) In an effort to make citizens more responsible and less recalcitrant in the face of 
tax payments, allow any citizen to directly distribute say 3% of his income and 
consumption taxes between an educational institution, a health institution or any 
other approved foundation or charity of his/her choice.  
Economists have shown and argued for a long time that to meet an overall objective of 
efficiency in the allocation of resources, taxation systems must be based on consumption taxes 
rather than taxes on labor: hence the need to abolish taxes on personal income in favor of 
consumption taxes (sales taxes or value-added taxes) as neutral as possible, i.e. with a single 
percentage applied to all goods and services consumed. An amount distributed to friends or 
family should be considered as consumed by the donor. Consumption should be taxed when it 
occurs or at the time of death, under the assumption that an individual is deemed to have 
consumed all of his or her accumulated wealth at the time of death.  
10. Promote free trade alliances with developing countries to get strategic advantages 
(head start ex ante or catch up ex post) in value-added competition with developed 
countries. 
The search for social and economic efficiency within one country or region in order to provide 
the best possible opportunities for productivity gains, growth enhancement and social well-
being improvement relies in part on free trade policies, across sectors and levels of the 
commercial and industrial landscape. The SDC model and project stress the importance of 
identifying, investing in, and implementing different ways to strike alliances with producers and 
providers from developing countries in order to gain, maintain, and consolidate competitive 
advantages among developed countries and, in so doing, favour the development of developing 
countries. With such a strategy, the latter countries would become prime allies as providers and 
developers of key inputs (not only intermediary products but also, in due time, new 
technologies, new products and new services) in the challenges that developed countries are 
posing to each other. 
6.  Conclusion: NCC and CSD, drastic but not utopian reforms 
The New Competitive Capitalism (NCC) as well as the Competitive Social-Democracy (CSD) 
reforms represent jointly major and challenging economic and social policies and programs. 
Those sets of policies and programs reinforce each other. The NCC and CSD reforms constitute a 
truly drastic and ambitious yet feasible and not utopian revolution.  
They will generate opposition and criticism and will be opposed by many interest groups from 
all sides of the debate. The reason is that they put the citizens, not the producers and not the 
politicians, at the center of the calculus of costs and benefits.  
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The NCC and CSD projects derive from an intellectually consistent approach with concrete 
political implications and applications. The foundations, tools, and instruments required for 
their implementation are already available. A profound reorganization of governments’ 
activities and priorities is necessary, but the NCC and CSD models and projects pave the way for 
such a change.113  
Innovations and the commercialization of new technologies and organisations are important 
causes of significant displacement of economic activity (changes in goods and services and the 
organisation of work and exchanges as well as contractual relationships) and of abrupt 
depreciation, sometimes quick obsolescence, of capital, skills, and competencies. A much 
needed fundamental policy is to foster the creation and implementation of tools, ways, and 
means to allow individuals, firms, and different levels of government to efficiently manage risks 
and opportunities that stem from the innovation and commercialization of new technologies 
and organisations.  
Market instrument solutions have been found via the introduction of a variety of insurance and 
derivative products and lifelong learning and retraining that enable users to manage and trade 
risks. There is today a need for new insurance-like, derivative-like and lifelong education 
products and processes to help individuals, firms and different levels of government manage the 
risk of change, both in the displacement of jobs and in the abrupt depreciation and 
obsolescence of financial and human capital.  
The recent 2008-2010 financial crisis has thrown in disarray and brought into disrepute many of 
those market instruments to manage risks. But one must realize that any significant 
technological advancement yields its share of good and bad applications. It is unfortunate that 
the bad applications often overshadow the good. Some examples of technological advancement 
that have had both good and bad applications include hammers, explosives, financial 
derivatives, and cyberspace.   
A significant source of opposition to socio-economic changes, even when such changes appear 
desirable from a social welfare viewpoint, is the absence of efficient mechanisms or institutions 
that could assist individuals as well as firms and organizations in reducing their direct cost of 
adaptation to such changes. When a society is confronted as a whole or in part with changes in 
its socio-economic environment, its capacity to adapt in order to maintain or increase its 
citizens’ well-being is crucial.  
                                                                
113 As usual, new ideas such as NCC and CSD models will go through three stages (Arthur Schopenhauer, apocryphal): 




This flexibility to adapt to a volatile environment must be a characteristic of all sectors 
producing and distributing private as well as public and social goods and services. Flexibility runs 
against inertia, inertia grows from fear, and fear grows from change. Unless people are given 
the tools to manage such change, they will resist it in the economic and political arenas, at 
significant social costs. Resistance to change is in most, if not all, circumstances a very poor 
substitute to adaptation to change.  
But the social attitude and flexibility towards socio-economic changes will depend on the 
existence of institutions (tools and means, organizations, and markets) allowing individuals, 
firms and different levels of government to efficiently manage risks, control their exposure to 
downside risks, and foster their exposure to upside opportunities. A proper set of risk-
management mechanisms and institutions is necessary for a flexible society where innovation, 
both technological and organizational, thrives.  
To be successful at innovation and commercialization, a society must develop a higher ability to 
analyze risky prospects (e.g. via a more educated workforce with a significant literacy in 
economics, business and finance) and favour a better exposition to structural factors, such as 
market size, enhanced competitive processes, and a higher reliance on well-designed and 
efficiently-produced and distributed social protection programs. 
